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What does the future hold for procedural due process? From the due process 
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s until recently, constitutional litigation was the 
primary driver of procedural innovation. Plaintiffs brought lawsuits challenging 
existing procedures under the Due Process Clause, and courts used the Supreme 
Court’s cost–benefit, interest-balancing approach to determine the specific dictates of 
due process. That approach reflected the Court’s longstanding view of procedural due 
process as flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances, but it also imposed 
significant evidentiary hurdles on due process plaintiffs. As a result, in recent years, 
due process doctrine has stagnated, with courts less and less interested in ordering 
additional or alternative procedural safeguards. 
At the same time, bottom-up procedural experimentation is on the rise. Across 
jurisdictions and legal contexts, government agencies and court systems are reforming 
procedures in ways that have been unachievable through litigation. These reforms—for 
example, creating a right to counsel in deportation and eviction cases, adopting 
electronic forms of notice, and requiring judges to play an active role in cases with pro 
se litigants—strike at the heart of the due process guarantee, yet the courts are not 
driving these changes. This has created a growing gap between due process doctrine and 
procedural innovations that are not the result of litigation. 
This Article analyzes the current divergence between due process doctrine and 
practice. It begins by tracing the shift from the due process revolution’s court-driven 
procedures to today’s bottom-up experimentation. Next, it examines three recent 
examples of procedural experimentation and situates those innovations within the 
Supreme Court’s due process doctrine. The Article then proposes a dialogic approach 
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to procedural due process, through which data generated by procedural innovations 
can help courts evaluate due process claims in litigation. By putting courts in 
conversation with the wave of procedural innovations unfolding across the nation, 
this dialogic approach can help revive an otherwise stagnant branch of constitutional 
doctrine and ensure that the Due Process Clause continues to guarantee fair 
procedures in the face of changing circumstances. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What does the future hold for procedural due process? Not too long ago, 
in the 1960s and 1970s, procedural due process claims occupied a prominent 
place on the Supreme Court’s docket and attracted the attention of the nation’s 
leading legal scholars. A series of Court decisions culminating in Goldberg v. 
Kelly1 greatly expanded the scope of the Due Process Clause’s coverage, 
 
1 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 
2019] Dialogic Due Process 1117 
triggering an “explosion”2 in due process litigation that came to be known as 
the “due process revolution.”3 Constitutional litigation was the primary driver 
of procedural innovation, with judges ruling that the Due Process Clause 
demanded more or different procedures in cases involving issues as diverse as 
welfare benefits,4 school discipline,5 family law,6 immigration deportation,7 
and public employment.8 In 1976, the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge9 adopted a 
cost–benefit approach for determining the requirements of procedural due 
process in civil contexts,10 and government agencies eventually conformed 
their procedures to the constitutional requirements. Since the 1990s, 
procedural due process doctrine has been relatively stable, with few notable 
Supreme Court decisions and limited scholarly analysis.11 
Even as due process doctrine stabilized, the facts and circumstances of many 
procedural contexts have continued to evolve. The more things change, the more 
likely it is that decades-old procedures must be updated to ensure fundamental 
fairness. Although the Supreme Court has explained that “‘due process,’ unlike 
some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to 
time, place and circumstances,”12 its modern approach to procedural due process 
imposes significant evidentiary hurdles on plaintiffs bringing due process 
 
2 Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975); see also JERRY 
L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 9 (1985) (noting that “federal court 
complaints of procedural due process deprivation in the 1970s showed a 350 percent increase over 
the 1960s,” compared to a seventy percent increase in federal civil litigation of all kinds). 
3 MASHAW, supra note 2, at 33 (“[B]y most accounts the due process revolution began with the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly . . . .”). 
4 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 274-75 (1970) (holding that the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires an evidentiary hearing before certain government benefits 
can be discontinued). 
5 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (establishing due process protections for 
students facing suspensions of ten days or less). 
6 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982) (defining the required standard of proof 
as “clear and convincing” in cases terminating parental custody rights). 
7 See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982) (holding that lawful permanent 
residents are entitled to certain due process protections). 
8 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1985) (holding that 
public employees are entitled to due process before losing their employment). 
9 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
10 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1979) (characterizing the Mathews analysis as “a 
general approach” for determining the specific procedures required by due process). 
11 See, e.g., Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1334-36 (2012) 
(discussing the ossification of due process procedures and the stagnation of procedural due process 
scholarship). The Supreme Court’s most notable recent procedural due process decision did not 
result in a meaningful change to the Mathews analysis. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 435 (2011) 
(rejecting a claim that the Due Process Clause automatically requires the provision of counsel at 
civil contempt proceedings when the defendant is an indigent individual facing incarceration for 
failure to pay child support to a child’s unrepresented custodian). 
12 Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334). 
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claims. As a result, courts have not been actively reassessing or reevaluating the 
constitutionality of longstanding procedural regimes. 
Yet procedural innovation has not stopped. In recent years, federal, state, 
and local agencies and court systems have been experimenting with new and 
additional procedures in a wide range of legal contexts. Cities have passed 
legislation guaranteeing government-funded lawyers for indigent people 
facing eviction and deportation.13 Agencies have adopted electronic 
notification systems to ensure that families receiving essential public benefits 
are given fast and reliable notice of benefit terminations or changes.14 And 
judges have developed practices and procedures for taking a more active role 
in cases involving pro se litigants.15 These experimental procedures hold the 
potential to benefit countless individuals and families, improving the fairness 
of legal proceedings where the stakes could not be higher. 
These new procedural innovations share three notable features. First, they 
are not the result of litigation involving due process claims. Instead, they have 
emerged through policy and legislative reforms or other initiatives that took 
effect without constitutional litigation. Second, even though these 
innovations are not court-driven, their proponents use the language of “due 
process” when explaining why the new procedures are necessary and valuable. 
And third, the innovations are either similar to, or extensions of, procedural 
innovations that have been the product of due process litigation in the past. 
In other words, despite being delinked from constitutional litigation and the 
development of due process doctrine, the new wave of innovation remains 
fundamentally connected to the Constitution’s due process guarantee. 
 
13 See, e.g., Liz Robbins, Mayor and City Council Make Deal on Lawyers for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/nyregion/mayor-and-city-council-make-deal-on-
lawyers-for-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/KFM8-G49K] (reporting on continued funding for a 
project that guarantees representation for indigent immigrants held in detention during their deportation 
proceedings); Press Release, Office of the Mayor of N.Y.C., Mayor de Blasio and Speaker Mark-Viverito 
Rally Around Universal Access to Free Legal Services for Tenants Facing Eviction in Housing Court 
(Feb. 12, 2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/079-17/state-the-city-mayor-de-blasio-
speaker-mark-viverito-rally-universal-access-free [https://perma.cc/EQ62-E45Y] (announcing funding 
that guarantees “all NYC tenants facing eviction access to free legal advice and low-income tenants with 
full legal representation”). 
14 See, e.g., Letter from Lizbeth Silbermann, Dir., Program Dev. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., to 
All Reg’l Dirs., Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (Nov. 3, 2017), https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/Memo-Electronic-Notice-and-Other-Options-11317.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3HAG-4EVS] (announcing changes to the electronic notification system for the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). 
15 See, e.g., Anna E. Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 647, 
649-50 (2017) (examining how judges change their practices when proceedings involve pro se litigants); 
Jessica K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An Empirical Look at a Problem-Solving Housing 
Court, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1058, 1059-60 (2017) (examining alternative judicial decisionmaking and 
procedural approaches in housing court cases involving pro se litigants). 
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As procedural innovations proliferate, how will they affect due process 
doctrine? Perhaps not at all—the innovations may take root or not, while the 
doctrine remains essentially static. After all, states and cities are free to 
provide procedural safeguards above and beyond the floor established by the 
Constitution. Under this view, bottom-up procedural innovations could serve 
as merely an interesting footnote to our understanding of the Due Process 
Clause—highly meaningful to the individuals and proceedings they affect but 
inconsequential as a doctrinal matter and irrelevant to people living in places 
where the innovations are not available. 
This Article considers a different outcome, one that is shaped by a 
dialogue between bottom-up procedural innovations and the courts’ 
development of due process doctrine. For over forty years, since its decision 
in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court has evaluated the constitutionality 
of procedural rules based on a fact-intensive cost–benefit analysis.16 Under 
Mathews, courts must consider three factors when determining the “specific 
dictates” of procedural due process:  
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.17  
The Court uses a similar balancing approach when considering whether the 
notice provided by the government satisfies due process.18 Thus, the 
procedural due process analysis is sensitive to the facts and circumstances of 
a particular procedural regime. This distinguishes due process from other 
individual rights conferred by the Constitution, making due process 
amenable to reevaluation and revision. 
The recent wave of procedural experimentation is generating precisely the 
kind of evidence that can influence future due process balancing. For each 
innovation, it may be possible to answer the following questions, among 
others: How much does a particular innovation cost? To what extent does it 
help avoid erroneous deprivations of constitutionally protected interests? Is 
it administratively feasible? As each innovation is implemented, it will be 
possible to gather data and answer these questions in ways that would be 
 
16 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
17 Id. at 319. 
18 See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229 (2006) (“[A]ssessing the adequacy of a particular 
form of notice requires balancing the ‘interest of the State’ against ‘the individual interest sought to 
be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr., 339 
U.S. 306, 314 (1950))). 
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otherwise impossible. This evidence could then be used to fuel litigation 
efforts to push due process doctrine in new and important directions. 
To be sure, there may be reasons to resist constitutionalizing the latest 
procedural innovations. Ever since the due process revolution, judges, 
government officials, advocates, and scholars have expressed concerns about 
extending the scope of constitutional protection.19 Just because an innovation 
is feasible or appropriate in one context or in one location does not necessarily 
mean that it should be extended more broadly. Similarly, some worry that 
raising the constitutional floor will stifle future innovation.20 Put simply, the 
recent flourishing of innovation could be perceived as proof that the courts 
and the Constitution should keep out. And fears of increased uncertainty and 
disruption are not to be taken lightly.21 
But the requirements of due process are particularly well-suited to evolve 
based on a dialogue between on-the-ground experimentation and legal 
doctrine. As the Supreme Court has emphasized in case after case, “due 
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands.”22 While the extent to which other constitutional rights 
may change over time is subject to intense dispute,23 the procedural rights 
conferred by the Due Process Clause are under no such constraints.24 
The idea that changing facts and circumstances can affect the meaning of 
a constitutional right is not a novel one. Courts interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures”25 look to an 
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,”26 which evolves over time. 
Similarly, courts interpreting the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel 
and unusual punishments”27 consider “evolving standards of decency that mark 
 
19  See infra subsection III.C.1. 
20  See infra subsection III.C.2. 
21  See infra subsection III.C.3. 
22  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); see also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 
(1991) (contrasting due process with bright-line legal rules and noting the importance of contextual 
factors). See generally infra subsection III.B.1. 
23 Compare Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 
673, 736 (1963) (“A constitutional provision can maintain its integrity only by moving in the same 
direction and at the same rate as the rest of society.”), with William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a 
Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 699 (1976) (arguing that the Constitution was “designed 
to enable the popularly elected branches of government, not the judicial branch, to keep the country 
abreast of the times”). 
24 See Parkin, supra note 11, at 1360-65 (citing precedent from the late nineteenth century 
forward characterizing due process as a “flexible” concept, susceptible to tailoring based on historical 
and societal circumstances). 
25 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
26 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 360 (1967)). 
27 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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the progress of a maturing society.”28 Nor is the concept of dialogue foreign to 
constitutional law, though it is typically used to describe an exchange between 
courts and legislatures29 or government officials and affected individuals.30 
This Article argues that a dialogic approach to procedural due process can 
reunify and revive due process doctrine. I do not suggest that every procedural 
innovation must be incorporated into due process doctrine—just that courts 
reviewing due process claims can and should look to non-court-driven reforms 
for insight into what the Due Process Clause requires. Specifically, courts 
should consider the data and information generated by procedural reforms 
when applying the interest-balancing tests mandated by the Supreme Court’s 
modern approach to due process. The result of that balancing may or may not 
provide a basis for courts to order additional or alternative procedural 
safeguards, but this kind of dialogue offers an opportunity to connect due 
process litigation with non-court-driven innovation and to revive an 
increasingly stagnant aspect of due process doctrine. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I traces the development of the 
Supreme Court’s modern approach to procedural due process. It highlights 
the role of courts as the drivers of procedural reform, particularly in the wake 
of the due process revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. After summarizing the 
leading critiques of the Court’s modern approach to due process, Part I 
concludes by noting the relative stability of contemporary procedural due 
process theory and doctrine. 
Part II turns away from court-driven procedure and toward the recent 
trend of procedural reform arising outside the context of constitutional 
litigation. It profiles three recent procedural innovations: a local legislature’s 
creation of a right to counsel in deportation and eviction proceedings, a federal 
agency’s approval of notice by electronic means, and trial court judges’ 
adoption of an “active judging” approach to cases involving pro se parties. This 
Part situates each innovation in its doctrinal context, noting that the 
innovations would not be attainable through due process litigation. It also 
 
28 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
29 See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203, 211 (2008) 
(describing the advantages of an approach by which “courts apply constitutional provisions such as the 
Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause through a dialogic process with the legislature to 
ensure that the scope of welfare provision democratically reflects our social understandings”). 
30 See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the Modern/Postmodern Search for the 
Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1002 (1988) (discussing “the possibilities of a coherent 
theory of dialogism in the relationship between dependent people and the state”); David L. Kirp, 
Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV. 841, 842 (1976) 
(describing the potential for due process hearings in the school discipline context to be “candid and 
informal exchange[s]” between administrators and students); Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due 
Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 310 (1975) (discussing role of courts in the ongoing 
dialogue between the state and individuals subject to the laws of the state). 
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describes how the innovations are generating substantial data and information 
about their costs and benefits. 
Part III explores how due process doctrine and theory can account for non-
court-driven innovations like the ones profiled in Part II. It begins by 
identifying the growing and harmful divergence between due process doctrine 
and the kinds of procedures that are actually available to affected individuals. 
Then, in light of the Due Process Clause’s deeply rooted flexibility and openness 
to evolution based on changing facts and circumstances, this Part proposes a 
dialogic approach to due process that encourages courts to consider non-court-
driven innovations when engaging in the requisite cost–benefit balancing to 
determine the requirements of due process. This Part then considers the limits 
and potential objections to a dialogic approach to procedural due process. The 
Article concludes by arguing that a dialogic approach is both consistent with due 
process theory and doctrine, and also a useful strategy to bridge the growing gap 
between non-court-driven innovations and the courts’ understanding of what 
the Due Process Clause requires. 
I. COURT-DRIVEN DUE PROCESS 
The relationship between courts and procedural due process is not as 
straightforward as it may seem. Over time, the Supreme Court has taken 
different approaches to due process claims, particularly with respect to 
evaluating the specific procedural safeguards required by the Due Process 
Clause. Since the 1970s, the Court has used a cost–benefit, interest-balancing 
approach, which requires courts to weigh the interests of affected individuals 
against the interests of the government. Despite substantial scholarly 
criticism, that approach has endured, and it has guided the design of the 
procedural regimes that are in effect today. 
This Part traces the evolution of due process doctrine and the Supreme 
Court’s modern approach to procedural due process. It highlights the Court’s 
interventionist rulings during the due process revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, 
and the Court’s ultimate retreat to a more deferential approach. It surveys the 
procedural reforms that were prompted by due process litigation, and it surfaces 
the leading scholarly critiques of the Court’s modern approach to procedural due 
process. Finally, this Part notes the relatively stagnant state of current due 
process doctrine and theory, and the lack of recent court-driven reforms. 
A. The Due Process Revolution and the Modern  
Approach to Procedural Due Process 
Throughout American history, the nation’s courts have been the arbiters of 
whether the government has provided due process of law before depriving 
2019] Dialogic Due Process 1123 
someone of “life, liberty, or property.”31 For nearly two hundred years, this 
inquiry was fairly ad hoc. Judges ruling on due process challenges looked to a 
mix of common law, history, tradition, and custom to assess whether the 
available procedures survived constitutional scrutiny.32 The Supreme Court had 
little to say about the specific procedural protections required by the Due 
Process Clause33—in most cases, “the Court merely referred to the requirement 
of a ‘hearing,’ on the assumption that everyone understood what it meant by the 
term ‘hearing.’”34 Instead, most of its due process rulings focused on whether or 
not the government’s action triggered due process protections at all.35 
 
31 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (guaranteeing that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law”); Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. 
L. REV. 1890, 1890 (2016) (“In the textbooks, procedural due process is a strictly judicial 
enterprise.”); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
32 See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 
(1855) (“[W]e must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and 
statue [sic] law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have 
been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement 
of this country.”); see also Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the 
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 468 (1986) (explaining that after a brief, early attempt 
to confine procedural due process to the “procedures that were integral to the English common law 
system,” the Court “quickly abandoned this approach, . . . choosing instead to ask whether a given 
procedure was essential to modern—as opposed to 17th century—notions of fairness”). 
33 See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 797 (5th ed. 2010) (“Until the 
1970s, the Court devoted little attention to the question of what process was due once it concluded 
that due process applied to an agency’s decisionmaking process.”); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process 
and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1044 (1984) (observing that the content of due 
process “seemed so clear to prior generations that they included the term ‘due process’ in the fifth 
and fourteenth amendments virtually without discussion”). 
Legal scholars similarly focused on other aspects of due process. See Redish & Marshall, supra 
note 32, at 455-56 (“[N]otwithstanding the voluminous scholarship dedicated to defining the 
interests triggering due process, little attention has been given a question of far greater importance 
to the typical litigant who invokes the clause: What process is due once it is recognized that the 
guarantee applies in a given case?”). 
34 PIERCE, supra note 33, at 797-98. “In the relatively few opinions in which the Court 
described the nature of the ‘hearing’ required by due process, its brief description suggested that 
the Court used ‘hearing’ to refer to a decisionmaking procedure modeled after a judicial trial, 
including oral presentation of evidence and cross-examination.” Id. at 798 (citing Greene v. McElroy, 
360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959)); see also Greene, 360 U.S. at 496-97 (equating due process procedures 
with the type of procedures available at a judicial trial). 
35 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a series 
of statutes that denied welfare assistance to certain individuals based solely on length of residency); 
Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 246-47 (1957) (holding that New Mexico 
unconstitutionally deprived an applicant to the state bar of his right to due process by denying his 
application on the basis of his former membership in the Communist Party); Slochower v. Bd. of 
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1956) (holding that a professor at a public university who 
refused to testify about his membership in the Communist Party before a federal legislative 
committee was entitled to more process than a “summary dismissal”); United States ex rel. Knauff 
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544, 546-47 (1950) (upholding the Attorney General’s refusal of an 
immigration hearing to the noncitizen wife of a World War II veteran). 
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The Court’s due process jurisprudence underwent two radical changes in the 
1960s and 1970s. In a series of decisions culminating in Goldberg v. Kelly,36 the 
Court held that the term “property” in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
includes a wider range of interests than the Court had previously recognized.37 
While the property interests protected by due process had historically been 
limited to “traditional common-law concepts of property,”38 Goldberg held that 
entitlements and interests created by the government—such as public benefits, 
licenses, and public employment, among many others—could amount to 
constitutionally protected property interests as well.39 
Goldberg also demonstrated the Court’s new willingness to specify the 
procedures required by the Due Process Clause.40 Rather than merely holding 
that a “hearing” was required before terminating someone’s welfare benefits, 
the Court proceeded to identify the precise procedural safeguards that due 
process requires in the welfare context. The Court clarified what it means for 
welfare recipients to receive timely and adequate notice,41 stating that 
recipients have a right to a hearing before their benefits are terminated.42 The 
Court explained that welfare recipients must have an opportunity to present 
evidence and argument orally,43 to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses,44 and to appear with an attorney.45 It also stated that hearing 
officers must be impartial and their decisions must be based on the record 
created at the hearing.46 
 
36 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1963) (citing a series of previous due 
process decisions to support holding that an individual’s interest in unemployment compensation 
benefits is a right rather than “merely a ‘privilege’”); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 555-57 (1958) 
(holding a citizen’s interest in a tax exemption to be protected by due process); Slochower, 350 U.S. 
at 555-57 (holding that interest in public employment is protected by due process). 
37 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
38 Id. at 262 n.8. 
39 Id. at 262. In just one year after deciding Goldberg, the Court held that “property” interests 
were at issue when the government suspended a driver’s license, denied social security benefits, and 
categorized a person as an “excessive” drinker. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542-43 (1971); 
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 
(1971); see also Friendly, supra note 2, at 1268 (“[T]he Court has carried the hearing requirement from 
one new area of government action to another.”). 
40 See PIERCE, supra note 33, at 799 (“Goldberg v. Kelly marked the beginning of the Court’s 
systematic effort to determine in detail the procedures required for the kind of ‘hearing’ sufficient 
to satisfy due process.” (internal citation omitted)). 
41 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268. 
42 Id. at 263-66. 
43 Id. at 269. 
44 Id. at 269-70. 
45 Id. at 270-71. 
46 Id. at 271. 
 
2019] Dialogic Due Process 1125 
But Goldberg did not announce a method or test for analyzing whether 
existing procedures comply with the Due Process Clause.47 Nor did it clarify 
whether and when courts should specify the procedures required by due 
process.48 In fact, in a handful of cases decided shortly after Goldberg, the 
Court took inconsistent approaches to this aspect of the due process analysis, 
specifying the procedures in some49 and declining to do so in others.50 
It was not until six years later, in Mathews v. Eldridge, that the Court 
adopted what has become the modern approach to procedural due process.51 
The plaintiff in Mathews claimed that the federal government’s procedures for 
terminating Social Security disability benefits did not comply with due 
process.52 In the course of rejecting the plaintiff ’s claim, the Court announced 
a new cost–benefit approach to evaluating whether existing procedures comply 
with the Due Process Clause.53 According to Mathews, courts must determine 
the “specific dictates of due process” by balancing the following three factors:  
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.54 
The Mathews approach marked a departure from the Court’s previous 
rulings on procedural due process. The Court paired Goldberg’s willingness to 
specify the requirements of procedural due process with an interest-balancing 
test for determining whether “additional or substitute procedural safeguards” 
 
47 That said, by 1975 there “ha[d] been a measure of consistency as to the factors which the 
Court . . . consider[ed] in determining what due process requires.” Note, Specifying the Procedures 
Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1517 
(1975) [hereinafter Specifying the Procedures]. 
48 See id. (“[T]here has been confusion as to whether the Court should itself specify a general set of 
procedures for similar future cases or whether it should leave this to be accomplished on a case-by-case 
basis.”); cf. PIERCE, supra note 33, at 799 (“Once it decided Goldberg, the Court was forced to consider 
carefully and critically what ‘hearing’ mean[t] in the context of resolving administrative disputes.”). 
49 See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
485-89 (1972). 
50 See, e.g., N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 
407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542-43 (1971). 
51 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); see also Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due 
Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 422 (2010) (“The Court’s modern approach to implementing the 
procedural aspects of the Due Process Clauses focuses on the three-factor balancing test set forth in 
Mathews v. Eldridge . . . .”). 
52 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323-25. 
53 Id. at 334-35. 
54 Id. 
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are required by the Constitution.55 Mathews made no reference to common 
law, history, or custom. Rather, its analysis focused on current conditions and 
the relative costs and benefits of expanding or modifying existing procedures. 
This is not altogether surprising, as Mathews involved a species of “new 
property” that until recently had fallen outside the protection of due 
process,56 and for which there were no examples of analogous past practices 
to guide the due process analysis.57 Yet the Court has since applied Mathews’s 
fact-driven, interest-balancing approach across a wide range of civil 
proceedings, far beyond the types of “new property” considered by the Court 
in Goldberg and Mathews.58 
Although Mathews supplied the “general approach” for determining the 
procedures required by the Due Process Clause,59 it did not address the notice 
that must be provided when the government deprives an individual of “life, 
 
55 Id. at 335. 
56 The Court’s decision in Goldberg was the first time it held that an individual’s interest in 
continued receipt of a public benefit could be a “property” interest protected by the Due Process 
Clause. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 & n.8 (1970) (“It may be realistic today to regard 
welfare entitlements as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’”). Following Goldberg, the Court had 
implied—without deciding—that Social Security disability benefits were a “property” interest as 
well. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971) (“We have held that ‘the interest of a covered 
employee under the [Social Security] Act is of sufficient substance to fall within the protection from 
arbitrary governmental action afforded by the Due Process Clause.’” (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 
363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960))); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (“We may accept the 
proposition[] advanced by the claimant . . . that the right to Social Security benefits is in one sense 
earned.” (quoting Flemming, 363 U.S. at 610) (internal quotations omitted)). 
57 Cf. PIERCE, supra note 33, at 798 (“Most of the disputes agencies are required to resolve 
today did not exist until recent decades and have no clear historical analogue.”). 
58 See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 444-45 (2011) (right to counsel in civil contempt 
proceedings to enforce child support orders); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 
43, 53-54 (1993) (seizure of real property through civil forfeiture); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11, 
24 (1991) (prejudgment attachment); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320, 
333-34 (1985) (attorney-payment rules in proceedings involving veterans’ benefits), superseded by statute, 
Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105, as recognized in Cintron v. 
West, 13 Vet. App. 251 (Vet. App. 1999); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985) 
(firing of public school employees); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (state parental rights 
termination proceedings); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27-28 (1981) (right to counsel 
for indigent parents in termination of parental rights proceedings); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 
(1981) (payment for blood tests in paternity suits); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) 
(involuntary civil commitment to mental hospitals); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (civil 
suspension of a driver’s license); Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 n.3 
(1978) (dismissal from a public university’s medical school). 
59 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1979) (referring to the Mathews test as “a general 
approach for testing challenged state procedures under a due process claim”); see also Gerald L. 
Neuman, The Constitutional Requirement of “Some Evidence”, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 631, 698 (1988) 
(“Eldridge balancing has increasingly colonized the domain of due process . . . .”). But cf. Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 309, 331 (1993) (“Although the Supreme Court has treated Mathews as furnishing 
a test for all seasons, it was designed for resolving claims of entitlement to particular types of 
administrative, rather than judicial, procedures.”). 
 
2019] Dialogic Due Process 1127 
liberty, or property.” It is axiomatic that individuals can exercise their right 
to be heard only if they are first notified of the proceedings.60 To assess 
whether notice is sufficient, the Court has relied on Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., which asks whether notice is “reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections.”61 Despite their differences, the Court has clarified that the 
Mathews and Mullane tests are to be applied in a similar fashion, with courts 
weighing the individual’s interests against the interests of the government.62 
B. Court-Driven Procedures 
The due process revolution gave rise to the modern, court-centric notion 
of procedural due process.63 Whether prompted by court order or merely the 
threat of litigation, government agencies were forced to conform old 
procedures and create new ones to satisfy the Court’s evolving interpretation 
 
60 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“Parties whose rights are to be affected are 
entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.” (quoting 
Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 223)); see also Friendly, supra note 2, at 1280-81 (“It is . . . 
fundamental that notice be given and that it be timely and clearly inform the individual of the proposed 
action and the grounds for it. Otherwise the individual likely would be unable to marshal evidence and 
prepare his case so as to benefit from any hearing that was provided.” (footnote omitted)). 
61 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167-68 (2002) 
(explaining that courts must use the Mullane reasonableness test—not the Mathews balancing test—when 
evaluating due process claims involving notice); W. Alexander Burnett, Casenote, Dusenbery v. United 
States: Setting the Standard for Adequate Notice, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 613, 626 (2003) (“In Dusenbery, the 
Court affirmed—in no unclear terms—that the Mullane standard is the appropriate analytical framework 
for determining whether a method of delivery of notice satisfies the due process requirements in the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
62 See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229 (2006) (applying Mullane and assessing the 
adequacy of the challenged notice by “balancing the interest of the State against the individual interest 
sought to be protected” (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sergio 
J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1114 (2012) (“Although Mullane did not 
engage in the balancing test outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, the decision is consistent with an approach 
that takes all of the relevant interests at stake into account to compare different procedures.”); Philip 
P. Ehrlich, A Balancing Equation for Social Media Publication Notice, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 2163, 2178 (2016) 
(“Although Mathews and Mullane use different language, both cases create the same cost-benefit test 
for courts to evaluate whether parties provided the best notice practicable.”). 
63 See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication 
in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 28-29 
(1976) (“During the 1970s the Supreme Court has undertaken an intensive review of administrative 
hearing procedures for conformity with constitutional requirements of due process of law . . . . What 
followed was a ‘due process revolution’—a flood of cases seeking to extend, or simply to apply, 
Goldberg’s precepts.” (footnote omitted)). But cf. Vermeule, supra note 31, at 1903 (“[T]here is no 
necessary connection between Mathews’s due process calculus and the notion that procedural due 
process must entail the allocation of primary decisional responsibility to courts.”). 
 
1128 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1115 
of the Due Process Clause.64 This dynamic was most evident in the “new 
property” context,65 but it extended to more traditional forms of property 
and liberty interests as well. 
Judicial scrutiny of due process procedures did not always result in 
agencies providing additional procedural safeguards, however. In fact, 
Goldberg itself arguably prompted a policy reversal that led to less, rather than 
more, procedural protections for welfare recipients. In November 1968, two 
years before Goldberg was decided, the agency responsible for administering 
the federal welfare program proposed regulations requiring state and local 
welfare agencies to make available free legal representatives to welfare 
recipients in the hearing process.66 The regulations were initially scheduled 
to become effective in 1969, but they were delayed and still pending when 
Goldberg came before the Court.67 Ultimately, Goldberg held that welfare 
recipients have a due process right to be represented by counsel at their 
hearings, but not that the government is obliged to provide free counsel to 
recipients.68 Following the Court’s decision, the agency revised its 
regulations, deleting the mandatory representation provision and limiting the 
hearing procedures to those specifically identified in Goldberg.69 
 
64 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Reality of Procedural Due Process—A Study of the Implementation 
of Fair Hearing Requirements by the Welfare Caseworker, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 726 n.6 (1972) 
(“Following Goldberg a number of courts have found state procedures for termination or suspension 
of public assistance benefits constitutionally defective.”); see also Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, supra 
note 11, at 1323 (“In response to the Supreme Court’s rulings in Goldberg and Mathews, federal, state, 
and local administrative agencies adjusted existing procedures and created new ones in order to 
satisfy the requirements of due process.”). These developments in due process doctrine were not 
always well received. See Kirp, supra note 30, at 842 (observing that “new applications” of due process 
doctrine “encountered resistance within the affected bureaucratic and professional organizations, 
which f[ou]nd the implementation of procedural norms threatening”). 
65 See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (discussing concept 
of “new property”); Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 
74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1256 (1965) (“The idea of entitlement is simply that when individuals have 
insufficient resources to live under conditions of health and decency, society has obligations to 
provide support, and the individual is entitled to that support as of right.”). 
66 See Fair Hearings—Public Assistance Programs, 33 Fed. Reg. 17,853 (Oct. 30, 1968) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. Ch. II) (proposing regulations requiring state and local welfare agencies to provide 
representation at welfare hearings beginning July 1, 1969); 34 Fed. Reg. 1354, 1356 (Jan. 28, 1969) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 220) (“Legal services must be made available to families who desire the 
assistance of lawyers at fair hearings and appropriate fee schedules . . . must be established to assure legal 
representation when desired.”). Notably, the regulations were issued after the three-judge district court 
in Goldberg issued its decision “signalling [sic] the new judicial attitude toward pre-termination notice 
and hearing . . . .” Scott, supra note 64, at 729. See generally Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968), aff ’d sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970). 
67 See Fair Hearings: Legal Services; Continuing Assistance, 34 Fed. Reg. 13,595 (Aug. 22, 1969) 
(postponing the effective date of regulations requiring representation at welfare hearings to July 1, 1970). 
68 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270-71. 
69 See Fair Hearings; Revocation of Regulations, 35 Fed. Reg. 10,591 (June 26, 1970) (codified 
at 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(3)(iii) (1973)) (removing the mandatory representation provision from the 
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Developments in Supreme Court doctrine also influenced legislation 
drafted by Congress. Although most major federal programs had been 
enacted by the time the Court’s modern procedural due process doctrine took 
shape, not all had. For example, in 1975, in the middle of the due process 
revolution, Congress passed landmark legislation that later became known as 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.70 The legislation imposed 
new requirements on schools serving students with special needs.71 Congress 
reasonably anticipated that school administrators’ decisions would be subject 
to due process scrutiny72 and mandated a set of procedural safeguards that 
were consistent with the Supreme Court’s modern approach to due process.73 
Individuals also looked to the courts for clarification and enforcement of 
their procedural due process rights. The late 1960s and 1970s saw an 
“explosion” of due process litigation.74 Although the volume of litigation 
eventually tapered off, plaintiffs have continued to turn to the courts for 
clarification on whether available procedures comply with the Due Process 
Clause and what additional or substitute procedural safeguards might be 
required by the Constitution. 
 
final regulations). See generally Scott, supra note 64 (discussing pre- and post-Goldberg hearing 
regulations). “Whether the implications of the Goldberg requirements or more concrete economic 
considerations were responsible for the decision to revoke the free legal representation requirement 
is not entirely clear.” Id. at 730. 
70 Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.). In 1990, Congress amended 
and renamed this legislation the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Pub. L. No. 
101-476, 104 Stat. 1103, 1142-43 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. § 1400 
et seq.); see also Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in Special Education 
Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415, 444 (2011) (“The IDEA was enacted . . . in the midst of what has 
come to be known as the due process revolution.”). 
71 Education for All Handicapped Children Act § 612. 
72 See Romberg, supra note 70, at 445 (“[N]otions of proceduralism were prominent in the 
minds of the Congress that enacted the IDEA . . . .”). Indeed, lower courts had already begun 
finding due process rights in the special education context. See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. 
Supp. 866, 875-76 (D.D.C. 1972) (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254) (holding that plaintiffs’ due process 
rights were violated); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 295 (E.D. 
Pa. 1972) (holding that plaintiff class of special education students had “established a colorable claim 
under the Due Process Clause”). 
73 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982) (explaining that “[b]oth the House and the 
Senate Reports attribute the impetus for the [Education for All Handicapped Children] Act and its 
predecessors to two federal-court judgments” rendering post-Goldberg due process decisions); see also 
Romberg, supra note 70, at 446 (“The due process revolution, as reflected in [two lower court rulings 
analyzing the due process rights of students with special needs], was . . . imported into the IDEA itself.”). 
74 Friendly, supra note 2, at 1268; see also MASHAW, supra note 2, at 9-10 (noting that “federal 
court complaints of procedural due process deprivation in the 1970s showed a 350 percent increase 
over the 1960s,” compared to a 70% increase in federal civil litigation of all kinds); Rubin, supra note 
33, at 1146 (“The welfare rights movement and related social trends brought a wider variety of 
administrative actions to the courts than they had previously seen.”). 
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Just as hearing procedures were revised in the wake of Goldberg and the due 
process revolution, so too were the notices provided by the government. Agencies 
promulgated new regulations establishing detailed standards for notices that were 
in line with the policymakers’ understanding of the constitutional requirements. 
Those regulations typically focused on the content and timeliness of the notice, 
with little detail as to how the notice was to be transmitted. At most, there were 
passing references to the “mailing” of the notices.75 
Not surprisingly, litigation involving the notice aspect of the Due Process 
Clause increased in the wake of Goldberg and the due process revolution. Once 
the Supreme Court endorsed an expanded definition of “property” under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,76 the notice that the government provided 
before depriving individuals of those “new property” interests came under 
constitutional scrutiny for the first time. In cases involving public benefits, 
public employment, and other interests, courts fleshed out what the Mullane 
“reasonably calculated” standard meant in these various contexts.77 The primary 
focus was on the content and timeliness of the notice,78 not on how the notice 
was transmitted to the affected individual. To the extent that courts considered 
notice transmission at all, they assumed that sending paper notices by mail to 
affected individuals was sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause.79 
C. Critiques of the Modern Approach to Procedural Due Process 
The Supreme Court’s modern approach to procedural due process 
prompted intense criticism.80 Although utilitarian balancing was not entirely 
new to the due process analysis,81 scholars assailed the Court’s adoption of such 
an approach in Mathews. Some argued that using a cost–benefit approach to 
determine which procedures are required by due process dilutes the 
Constitution’s protections against procedural unfairness.82 Cynthia Farina 
 
75 See infra notes 136–138 and accompanying text (describing notice requirements contained in 
food stamps statute and regulations). 
76 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8. 
77 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
78 See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 3 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 17.8(h) (5th ed. 2012) (discussing Mullane and its progeny). 
79 Id. 
80 See Rubin, supra note 33, at 1044 (observing, less than a decade after Mathews, that “[t]he 
procedural due process doctrine is now the subject of intense debate, with its central meaning 
regularly questioned by both courts and commentators”). 
81 See Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1943) (defining “due 
process of law” as “a weighing or balancing of the various interests which overlap or come in conflict 
and a rational reconciling or adjustment”). But cf. Rubin, supra note 33, at 1137 (“Although Justice 
Powell stated [in Mathews] that the three factors had been dictated by the Court’s ‘prior decisions,’ 
they were largely new to due process adjudication.” (footnote omitted)). 
82 Specifying the Procedures, supra note 47, at 1527 (“When courts accept essentially utilitarian 
justifications for withholding procedural protections, the due process clause ceases to be respected 
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characterized Mathews’s use of utilitarian balancing as “deeply troubling,” 
asking, “If due process is to mark out and defend a sphere in which the 
individual is reliably preserved from the demands of the collective, how can 
the extent of the protection the individual receives turn on some calculus 
explicitly designed to maximize aggregate welfare?”83 Others, most notably 
Jerry Mashaw, criticized the Mathews approach for conceiving of the values of 
due process too narrowly,84 underemphasizing “process values,” and ignoring 
the complexities and ambiguities present in many procedural systems.85 
The interest-balancing approach has also been criticized for being difficult—if 
not impossible—to apply.86 As an initial matter, some scholars have argued that 
courts—as compared to legislatures and administrative agencies—lack the 
institutional competence to engage in this type of cost–benefit analysis.87 Scholars 
 
as a basic right which the individual can assert against the power of government and becomes instead 
simply one of the several checks and balances in the separation of powers scheme.”). 
83 Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 234 (1991); see also 
Martha F. Davis, Participation, Equality, and the Civil Right to Counsel: Lessons from Domestic and 
International Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2260, 2279 (2013) (“In practice, th[e Mathews] approach tends to 
reinforce hierarchies of economic privilege and the status quo of access to justice, as what process is 
due rests on the value of that process to society.”); cf. John J. Capowski, Reflecting and Foreshadowing: 
Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), in THE POVERTY LAW CANON: EXPLORING THE MAJOR CASES 219, 
219 (Marie A. Failinger & Ezra Rosser eds., 2016) (“Mathews is a case that foreshadowed the 
rightward political movement in this country.”). 
84 See Mashaw, supra note 63, at 46 (“The Supreme Court’s analysis in Eldridge is not informed 
by systematic attention to any theory of the values underlying due process review. The approach is 
implicitly utilitarian but incomplete, and the Court overlooks alternative theories that might have 
yielded fruitful inquiry.”); see also Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More 
Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 154-56 (1978) (arguing that 
Mathews undervalues dignitary interests). 
85 Mashaw, supra note 63, at 48; see also Farina, supra note 83, at 235 (arguing that the Mathews 
analysis “shares with all cost/benefit assessments the tendency to overlook, or at least underrate, 
‘soft’ variables”); Redish & Marshall, supra note 32, at 474 (arguing that the Mathews balancing 
approach fails because it is unable to account for “the traditional concerns of procedural justice that 
the framers most certainly intended when they shaped the two amendments”); Rubin, supra note 33, 
at 1138 (“[T]he [Mathews] criteria themselves focus on subsidiary issues rather than the essence of 
the due process guarantee”); Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. 
Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 158 (2011) (“[T]he 
Mathews v. Eldridge formulation, focused on accuracy, does not take other goals that can be assigned 
to due process into account.”). 
86 See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 33, at 812 (“Like Hand’s formula, the Mathews formula is 
conceptually simple but extremely difficult to apply.”); Mashaw, supra note 63, at 48 (“[T]he 
[Mathews] calculus asks unanswerable questions.”); Rubin, supra note 33, at 1138 (“[T]he Mathews 
framework presents considerable difficulties.”). 
87 See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 33, at 820 (“The complicated nature of the cost–benefit analysis required 
by the Mathews test raises serious questions concerning the competence of judges to apply that test.”); see 
also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 
1999 (1996) (“Politically accountable legislatures are far better than courts at determining the 
relative social value of the myriad benefits they choose to make available by statute, and agencies 
are far better than courts at performing the difficult empirical work required to estimate the costs 
 
1132 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1115 
have noted that judges reviewing due process claims rarely have before them the 
types of data and empirical information that the three-factor balancing test 
requires.88 Indeed, Mathews requires courts to predict the impact of “additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards,”89 which typically have not been utilized in the 
context at issue.90 Moreover, it is far from clear how courts are to determine the 
“weight” of each Mathews factor91 or how to weigh the three factors against each 
other.92 As a result, critics claim that the Mathews approach creates uncertainty 
about the requirements of due process,93 both for legislators and policymakers 
 
and benefits of alternative decisionmaking procedures.”). Pierce writes, “Courts systematically 
overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs of formal decisionmaking.” Id. 
88 See Farina, supra note 83, at 196 (“Although framed in terms that invite quantitative analysis, 
the Mathews balance is rarely conducted with empirical evidence.”). Judith Resnik succinctly 
explained the problem: 
[E]ven as Mathews v. Eldridge prompts a judicial accounting of the bases for a due 
process ruling, its veneer of scientific constraints on judicial judgment can serve to 
mask the lack of genuine empiricism. Neither judges nor litigants can identify with 
any rigor the actual costs of various procedures, let alone model (or know) the impact 
in terms of false positives and negatives produced by the same, more, or different 
processes . . . . While one can state the equation, one cannot do the math because the 
data are missing. Interpretive choices abound. 
Resnik, supra note 85, at 158; cf. Friendly, supra note 2, at 1303 (“[F]ive years after Goldberg, we have 
so little empirical knowledge how it has worked in its own field, let alone in others where its 
principles have been applied.”). 
89 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
90 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 83, at 235 (“How can the Court predict the number of errors that 
would be avoided by, for example, permitting the individual to present oral testimony? Or the cost 
to the government that would be entailed? Although in theory quantifiable, these factors cannot, 
realistically, be quantified.”). 
91 See, e.g., Specifying the Procedures, supra note 47, at 1519 (“No scale has been calibrated which 
courts, legislators, and administrators can use to sensitively and predictably measure either the 
relative severity of deprivations inflicted upon individuals or the relative importance of 
governmental interests in summary action.”). 
92 See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 33, at 1138 (“This reliance upon ‘weight,’ which is a useful approach 
for dealing with bananas, leaves something to be desired where factors such as those in Mathews are 
concerned.”); Specifying the Procedures, supra note 47, at 1520 (“[T]here is no method by which the 
weight of the individual’s interest in obtaining protective procedures and the weight of the 
government’s interest in acting informally—optimistically assuming that each of these can somehow 
be accurately measured in isolation from the other—can be compared.”). 
93 See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 33, at 805 (“Application of the Mathews approach to a given class 
of disputes has the potential to yield any of a wide range of minimum procedural safeguards 
depending on the Justices’ assessment of the three factors encompassed in the Mathews balancing 
test.”); Farina, supra note 83, at 196 (“[T]he precise outcome of the balancing in any given case is 
virtually impossible to predict . . . .”); Specifying the Procedures, supra note 47, at 1519 (“[T]he concept 
of ‘weight’ employed in the interest-balancing doctrine is of such a subjective and ambiguous nature 
that use of interest balancing necessarily occasions great uncertainty.”); see also PIERCE, supra note 
33, at 809 (“Not surprisingly, circuit courts often differ with respect to the results of their 
applications of the Mathews test to similar cases.”). 
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seeking to comply with the Due Process Clause94 and for individuals unsure 
whether they have suffered a violation of their due process rights.95 
Despite these critiques and challenges, the interest-balancing approach to 
procedural due process endures. The Court has had numerous opportunities 
to modify or overturn its due process precedents but has declined to do so. It 
has also had occasion to limit the application of Mathews to public benefits 
adjudications or “new property” claims, but it has not. To the contrary, it 
continues to apply Mathews in new situations that bear little resemblance to 
the type of “new property” at issue in that case.96 
Just as the Court’s approach to procedural due process claims has remained 
stable for decades, so too has the resulting case law. Procedural regimes that 
were established or modified in the wake of the due process revolution remain 
largely identical today.97 Whether due to evidentiary hurdles created by the 
cost–benefit approach or to a growing reluctance among judges to hold 
existing procedures unconstitutional and to specify new procedures,98 due 
process procedures can appear stuck in the past, despite ever-increasing 
changes that arguably bear upon one or more of the Mathews factors.99 
There may be reasons to revisit old procedures and redo the due process 
analysis with new facts.100 Courts, policymakers, legislatures, and litigants 
now have access to new technology, new insights into how procedural systems 
function, and new evidence of how individuals use (or fail to use) the 
procedures that are available to them. But courts have not been sites for this 
 
94 See, e.g., Specifying the Procedures, supra note 47, at 1520 (“[E]xcessive uncertainty as to what the 
requirements of due process are may seriously hamper the efforts of legislators and administrators to 
fashion governmental programs which comport with due process and yet are efficiently administered.”). 
95 See, e.g.,  id. at 1521 (arguing that the uncertainty and unpredictability created by an interest-
balancing approach to procedural due process “may require citizens affected by similar governmental actions 
to relitigate repeatedly the issue of whether the minimum requirements of due process have been satisfied”). 
96 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-35 (2004) (applying Mathews in case where 
a U.S. citizen was detained as an enemy combatant). But see id. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority for applying the Mathews test, which was derived from “a case involving . . . 
the withdrawal of disability benefits!”); Fallon, supra note 59, at 331 (“Although the Supreme Court has 
treated Mathews as furnishing a test for all seasons, it was designed for resolving claims of 
entitlement to particular types of administrative, rather than judicial, procedures. Claims of a right 
to judicial review raise issues lying beyond the Mathews framework.” (footnote omitted)). 
97 See Farina, supra note 83, at 254 (“At the agency level, we have watched programs rigidify around the 
contours of entitlement, as constitutional floors become process ceilings.”); Parkin, supra note 11, at 1334-36 
(discussing the ossification of due process procedures in the decades after the due process revolution). 
98 This is consistent with the broader trend of judges becoming more deferential to 
government policy choices and less inclined to micromanage government agencies. See, e.g., Ronald 
M. Levin, Administrative Procedure and Judicial Restraint, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 338, 347 (2016) 
(“[T]oday’s courts do not seem particularly eager to expand procedural rights in administrative 
adjudication . . . .”); see also infra subsection III.C.1. 
99 See, e.g., Parkin, supra note 11, at 1336-60 (discussing changes in the facts and circumstances 
of welfare programs and welfare recipients following the Goldberg decision). 
100 See id. at 1366-74. 
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kind of rigorous reevaluation of due process procedures, despite the Supreme 
Court’s frequent reminder that “‘due process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not 
a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 
circumstances.”101 Procedural innovation is happening, but unlike the 
innovations of the 1960s and 1970s, it is not being driven by courts. 
II. BOTTOM-UP PROCEDURAL INNOVATION 
Not content to wait for courts to reassess longstanding due process 
precedents, legislatures, policymakers, and advocates have been seeking 
procedural innovations outside of litigation. Some of these innovations are ones 
that courts had previously rejected as not required by the Due Process Clause. 
Others are procedures that have never been the subject of constitutional 
litigation. Either way, the result is that procedural safeguards are evolving 
without judicial intervention—or even the threat of judicial intervention. 
Despite the detachment from constitutional litigation, much of the rhetoric 
associated with these reforms sounds in due process. Proponents frequently 
describe the reforms as necessary to ensure that proceedings are fair and 
participants are afforded due process. For them, the concept of “due process” 
appears to have meaning and power that is not bound by the limits of due process 
doctrine. Indeed, in some instances, proponents of procedural reforms describe 
the reforms as compelled by due process even when courts have uniformly held 
that the Due Process Clause does not in fact require the procedures at issue. 
This Part identifies three examples of non-court-driven procedural 
reforms: the right to appointed counsel, electronic transmission of notice, and 
active judging. The examples represent a new and growing trend in which 
procedural reforms and innovations are being driven not by creative and 
precedent-setting constitutional litigation, as during the due process 
revolution, but rather by reform efforts and experimentation that are 
unfolding outside formal due process doctrine. 
A. Right to Counsel 
Since the due process revolution, the Supreme Court has considered on a 
number of occasions whether the Due Process Clause requires the government 
to provide a lawyer before depriving an individual of her constitutionally 
protected interest. The Court declined to reach the question in Goldberg v. Kelly 
as it related to welfare hearings,102 but it could not dodge the issue for long. 
 
101 Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)). 
102 See 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (“We do not say that counsel must be provided at the pre-termination 
hearing, but only that the recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires.”). Justice Black, 
writing in dissent, asserted that even though the majority decision “requires only the opportunity to have 
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Ultimately, the Court held that due process does not require appointment of 
counsel in civil proceedings unless a person’s liberty is at stake,103 and, even 
then, procedural safeguards short of a right to counsel can be sufficient.104 
Despite the Supreme Court’s hostility towards civil right-to-counsel 
claims,105 the idea that the Due Process Clause may require appointment of a 
lawyer is a persistent one. With respect to deportation and eviction 
proceedings, for example, scholars have put forward various arguments for a 
right to appointed counsel rooted in due process. Employing the Court’s 
Mathews analysis, they have identified the various interests at stake, weighed 
those interests against each other, and argued that the Due Process Clause 
mandates the appointment of counsel. Some argue for a categorical right to 
counsel in deportation106 and eviction proceedings,107 while others focus on 
 
the benefit of counsel at the administrative hearing, . . . it is difficult to believe that the same reasoning 
process would not require the appointment of counsel, for otherwise the right to counsel is a meaningless 
one since these people are too poor to hire their own advocates.” Id. at 278-79 (Black, J., dissenting). His 
prediction has not come true. 
103 See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 442 (2011) (“[The] pre-eminent generalization that 
emerges from this Court’s precedents on an indigent’s right to appointed counsel is that such a right 
has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the 
litigation.” (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981))). Compare Turner, 564 
U.S. at 448 (holding that there is no right to counsel in civil contempt proceedings for nonsupport 
of child), and Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 23 (holding that there is no right to counsel in termination of 
parental rights cases), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1974) (holding that there is no 
right to counsel in prison discipline cases), with In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (holding that 
juveniles in delinquency cases have a right to counsel), and Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496-97 
(1980) (holding that where the state seeks to transfer an indigent prisoner to a mental health facility 
against his will, a “qualified representative” must be provided). 
104 See Turner, 564 U.S. at 447-48 (rejecting plaintiff ’s right-to-counsel argument and holding 
that a set of “substitute procedural safeguards” can satisfy due process even when the plaintiff ’s 
liberty is at stake); Vitek, 445 U.S. at 500 (Powell, J., concurring) (describing the majority as holding 
that a prisoner involuntarily transferred to a mental health facility has a right to “qualified and 
independent assistance” but not necessarily an attorney). 
105 This hostility contrasts, of course, with the Court’s right-to-counsel jurisprudence in the 
criminal context. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (holding that indigent 
defendants in state criminal proceedings have a right to appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment). 
106 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the 
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1629-30 (2010); Beth J. Werlin, 
Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed Counsel in Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 393, 395 (2000); William Haney, Comment, Deportation and the Right to Counsel, 11 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 177, 185 (1970). 
107 See, e.g., Rachel Kleinman, Housing Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Eviction Cases, 31 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1509-18 (2004); Andrew Scherer, Gideon’s Shelter: The Need to Recognize 
a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557, 558 
(1988); Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face Losing Their Homes in Legal Proceedings Must Have a 
Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 699, 700 (2006); Steven Gunn, Note, 
Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants: Costly Compassion or Justice Served?, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385, 
421 (1995); Ken Karas, Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction Proceedings in New 
York, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527, 538-53 (1991). See generally Raymond H. Brescia, Sheltering 
Counsel: Towards a Right to a Lawyer in Eviction Proceedings, 25 TOURO L. REV. 187 (2009) 
 
1136 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1115 
the due process rights of particular subgroups.108 Such subgroups in the 
immigration context include noncitizens who are asylum seekers,109 who lack 
mental competency,110 who are juveniles or unaccompanied minors,111 and who 
are lawful permanent residents,112 among others.113 Similar subgroups have 
been identified in the eviction context as well.114 The academic literature thus 
reflects a persistent effort to argue for a right to counsel under the Mathews 
approach to procedural due process. 
 
(summarizing arguments presented by advocates who seek to establish a right to counsel for indigent 
tenants in eviction proceedings). 
108 See Jason Parkin, Due Process Disaggregation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 287-88 (2014) 
(considering the due process rights of subgroups of individuals with different procedural needs than 
the typical individual in a particular procedural context). 
109 See John R. Mills, Kristen M. Echemendia & Stephen Yale-Loehr, “Death Is Different” and a 
Refugee’s Right to Counsel, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 361, 363 (2009); Nimrod Pitsker, Comment, Due Process 
for All: Applying Eldridge to Require Appointed Counsel for Asylum Seekers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 169, 171 (2007). 
110 See Alice Clapman, Hearing Difficult Voices: The Due-Process Rights of Mentally Disabled Individuals in 
Removal Proceedings, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373, 377 (2011); Johan Fatemi, A Constitutional Case for Appointed 
Counsel in Immigration Proceedings: Revisiting Franco-Gonzalez, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 915, 940-53 (2016); 
Aliza B. Kaplan, Disabled and Disserved: The Right to Counsel for Mentally Disabled Aliens in Removal Proceedings, 
26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 523, 558 (2012); Developments in the Law—Immigrant Rights & Immigration 
Enforcement, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1675-78 (2013); Helen Eisner, Comment, Disabled, Defenseless, and Still 
Deportable: Why Deportation Without Representation Undermines Due Process Rights of Mentally Disabled 
Immigrants, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 511, 514-36 (2011); Christopher Klepps, Note, What Kind of “Process” Is 
This?: Solutions to the Case-by-Case Approach in Deportation Proceedings for Mentally Incompetent Non-Citizens, 
30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 545, 547 (2012). 
111 See Elizabeth M. Frankel, Detention and Deportation with Inadequate Due Process: The 
Devastating Consequences of Juvenile Involvement with Law Enforcement for Immigrant Youth, 3 DUKE 
F. L. & SOC. CHANGE 63, 103-05 (2011); Linda Kelly Hill, The Right to Be Heard: Voicing the Due 
Process Right to Counsel for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 41,44 (2011); 
Benjamin Good, Note, A Child’s Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 109, 
128-47 (2014); see also Susan Hazeldean, Confounding Identities: The Paradox of LGBT Children Under 
Asylum Law, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 373, 417-32 (2011) (arguing for a due process right to counsel 
for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) children and young adults seeking asylum). 
112 See Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122 YALE L.J. 
2394, 2414 (2013); Developments in the Law—Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, supra note 
110, at 1674-75; see also Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed 
Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 
68 (2012) (arguing for a due process right to counsel for lawful permanent residents who are detained 
during their deportation proceedings); Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right 
to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 116 (2008) (listing the ways in which 
detention impacts a noncitizen’s ability to effectively defend against removal). 
113 See, e.g., Christen Chapman, Relief from Deportation: An Unnecessary Battle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1529, 1554-69 (2011) (arguing for due process right to counsel for individuals who are statutorily 
eligible to seek relief from removal); David A. Robertson, An Opportunity to Be Heard: The Right to 
Counsel in a Deportation Hearing, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1037-40 (1988) (same). 
114 See, e.g., Meghan P. Carter, Comment, How Evictions from Subsidized Housing Routinely 
Violate the Rights of Persons with Mental Illness, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 118, 136-40 (2010) (arguing 
that individuals with mental disabilities who are facing eviction from subsidized housing have a due 
process right to appointed counsel). 
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Arguments for a due process right to counsel have made no headway in the 
courts,115 but that is not the end of the story. Recent nonlitigation efforts in 
New York City have succeeded in guaranteeing counsel for indigent individuals 
appearing in deportation and eviction proceedings. First, beginning in 2014, 
the New York City Council began to fund the provision of counsel to all 
detained noncitizens with cases pending in the local immigration court.116 
Then, in 2017, the City Council established a right-to-counsel program for all 
indigent tenants defending against eviction in the city’s housing courts.117 
 
115 See, e.g., C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 1122, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that there is no 
due process right to appointed counsel for noncitizen minors in immigration deportation 
proceedings), rehearing en banc granted by 904 F.3d 642 (2018); Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 
565, 568 n.3 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that noncitizens do not have a categorical right to government-
appointed counsel in immigration deportation proceedings); N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Johnson, 565 
N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (App. Term 1990) (rejecting a due process right to counsel in residential tenant 
eviction proceedings); cf. Blatch ex rel. Clay v. Hernandez, 360 F. Supp. 2d 595, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(finding a due process violation in a case brought by a class of public housing tenants with mental 
disabilities); Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG, 2013 WL 3674492, at *3-9 (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (holding that a class of detained noncitizens with mental disabilities has a right 
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to appointed counsel in immigration deportation 
proceedings, without reaching the due process claim). 
116 See Universal Representation for Immigrants Facing Deportation, VERA INST. JUST., 
https://www.vera.org/projects/universal-representation-for-immigrants-facing-deportation/learn-more 
[https://perma.cc/ULM5-NVSK] (describing the New York Immigrant Family Unity Project); Lindsay 
Nash, Universal Representation, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 503, 510-13 (2018) (same). 
Since the universal representation program began in New York City, other jurisdictions have 
created similar systems. See NINA SIULC & KAREN BERBERICH, VERA INST. JUST., A YEAR OF 
BEING SAFE: INSIGHTS FROM THE SAFE NETWORK’S FIRST YEAR 1 n.2 (Nov. 2018), 
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/a-year-of-being-
safe/legacy_downloads/a-year-of-being-safe.pdf (describing the expansion of universal representation 
programs to Oakland and Alameda County, CA; Sacramento, CA; Santa Ana, CA; Denver, CO; 
Austin, TX; San Antonio, TX; Dane County, WI; Chicago, IL; Columbus, OH; Atlanta, GA; 
Baltimore, MD; and Prince George’s County, MD). 
117 See N.Y. City Local Law No. 136, § 1 (2017) (amending local law to provide legal services for 
tenants who are subject to eviction proceedings); Press Release, Office of the Mayor of N.Y.C., Mayor 
de Blasio Signs Legislation to Provide Low-Income New Yorkers with Access to Counsel for 
Wrongful Evictions (Aug. 11, 2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/547-17/mayor-de-
blasio-signs-legislation-provide-low-income-new-yorkers-access-counsel-for#/0 
[https://perma.cc/4ZSW-ARJG] (describing the city’s efforts to ensure legal representation in 
housing court). One year after its passage, there are efforts to amend the law to expand eligibility for 
legal representation. See Andrew Denney, NYC Council Considering Bill to Further Expand Tenants’ Right 
to Counsel, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/09/14/nyc-
council-considering-bill-to-further-expand-tenants-right-to-counsel/?slreturn=20190231114350  
(describing introduction of bill that would expand eligibility to tenants who are at 400 percent of the 
poverty level or below). 
Since New York City began its program, San Francisco, CA, and Newark, NJ, have adopted similar 
programs for tenants in eviction proceedings. See J.K. Dineen, SF’s Measure F Wins, Will Give Tax-
Funded Legal Help to Tenants Facing Eviction, S.F. CHRON. (Jun. 5, 2018), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/SF-Measure-F-to-give-tax-funded-legal-help-to-
12970924.php [https://perma.cc/7K6V-HJ7B] (reporting on approval of a San Francisco ballot initiative 
that guarantees counsel for tenants in eviction proceedings regardless of the tenant’s income); Newark, 
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One might view these right-to-counsel programs as an example of pure 
policy development. After all, local governments routinely identify problems 
of concern, develop solutions, and appropriate funding for implementation of 
those solutions. From one perspective, that is what happened when New York 
City went ahead and guaranteed counsel in these deportation and eviction 
cases. Proponents of the right to counsel presented testimony and proposals 
as part of coordinated advocacy campaigns, legislators and policymakers 
considered the alternatives, and ultimately the city’s legislature took action. 
Yet there is another way to look at these reforms. Even though they did 
not involve litigation or even the threat of litigation, proponents of the reforms 
framed the debate in terms of fairness and the right to “due process.”118 They 
did this even though many of them were lawyers and were well aware that no 
courts—let alone the Supreme Court—have held that the Due Process Clause 
requires the provision of counsel in deportation or eviction proceedings.119 
Nonetheless, the proponents understood that the concept of “due process” has 
meaning and power that extends beyond Supreme Court jurisprudence, and 
they marshaled that power in support of their reform efforts. 
In addition to establishing a right to counsel in deportation and eviction 
proceedings, the New York City reforms have been accompanied by a commitment 
to research and evaluation. Careful analysis of the value of legal representation has 
 
N.J., Ordinance 18-0673 (Dec. 19, 2018)  (guaranteeing counsel to tenants with incomes below 200% of 
the federal poverty level who are in eviction proceedings). Bills that would create similar guarantees 
are pending in additional jurisdictions. See S. 652, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2019) 
(proposing to guarantee counsel in Connecticut for tenants making less than $50,000 per year who are 
in an eviction proceeding); H. 1537, 191st Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019); H. 3456, 191st Gen. 
Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019); S. 913, 191st Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019) (providing a right to 
counsel in eviction proceedings in Massachusetts for persons who are “indigent”). 
118 For an example related to eviction proceedings, see Samar Khurshid, Push to Expand Your Right 
to an Attorney Gains Momentum, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Feb. 12, 2015), 
http://www.gothamgazette.com/government/5571-push-to-expand-your-right-to-an-attorney-gains-
momentum-levine-mark-viverito-de-blasio [https://perma.cc/4ZSW-ARJG] (quoting Andrew 
Scherer’s statement that “[i]t’s impossible for an unrepresented tenant to navigate the court system 
without having an attorney and it’s a matter of fundamental due process”). 
For examples related to deportation proceedings, see Press Release, Vera Institute of Justice, New 
York State Becomes First in the Nation to Provide Lawyers for All Immigrants Detained and Facing 
Deportation, (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.vera.org/newsroom/press-releases/new-york-state-becomes-first-
in-the-nation-to-provide-lawyers-for-all-immigrants-detained-and-facing-deportation 
[https://perma.cc/VS7J-A37A] (quoting proponents of right-to-counsel program stating that it will “help 
thousands of immigrant families receive due process,” “ensure due process,” and “provid[e] a basic level of 
due process”); Roque Planas & Elise Foley, De Blasio Under Fire for Plan to Keep Some Immigrants out of Legal 
Aid Program, HUFFPOST (June 2, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/de-blasio-under-fire-for-
restricting-immigrants-access-to-lawyers_us_59318c3ce4b02478cb9af54b [https://perma.cc/JQ8X-ATUP] 
(quoting a letter from twenty-seven City Council members referring to Mayor De Blasio’s changes to the 
right-to-counsel program as undermining part of “our city’s commitment to due process for all”). 
119 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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been a part of the immigration program since its inception.120 Using quantitative 
analyses of administrative and program data, evaluators have studied the program’s 
impact on the noncitizens who receive representation, their families, and local 
budgets.121 The eviction right-to-counsel initiative was similarly grounded in 
extensive research and evaluation,122 and the recently enacted legislation imposes 
robust reporting requirements upon the city agency responsible for administering 
the program.123 Among other things, the city must track both case outcomes and 
the costs of the program.124 Thus, both right-to-counsel programs are generating 
detailed and extensive data about the costs and benefits of guaranteed counsel.125 
B. Electronic Notice 
A second example of non-court-driven procedural reform targets the 
notice that the Due Process Clause requires before an individual is deprived 
of a constitutionally protected interest. There is a long line of Supreme Court 
cases ruling on the constitutionality of different forms of notice.126 Notice can 
be provided orally or in writing or both; it can be transmitted in person or by 
telephone, mail, or electronic means. Some due process cases involve 
 
120 See Peter L. Markowitz et al., Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in 
Removal Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 360 (2011) (describing the goals of the Study Group on 
Immigrant Representation’s research); see also PETER L. MARKOWITZ ET AL., STUDY GROUP ON 
IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION, ACCESSING JUSTICE II: A MODEL FOR PROVIDING COUNSEL TO 
NEW YORK IMMIGRANTS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 1 (2012), 
https://cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/New%20York%20Immigrant%20Representation%20Study%2
0II%20-%20NYIRS%20Steering%20Committee%20%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/VKX4-WAND] 
(proposing data-driven solutions for the immigration representation crisis). 
121 See JENNIFER STAVE ET AL., VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF THE NEW 
YORK IMMIGRANT FAMILY UNITY PROJECT: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF LEGAL 
REPRESENTATION ON FAMILY AND COMMUNITY UNITY 5 (2017), 
https://www.vera.org/publications/new-york-immigrant-family-unity-project-evaluation 
[https://perma.cc/DU4U-D8VH] (analyzing the impact of NYIFUP). 
122 See, e.g., STOUT RISIUS ROSS, INC., THE FINANCIAL COST AND BENEFITS OF 
ESTABLISHING A RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN EVICTION PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTRO 214-A 2-6 
(2016), 
https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/SRR_Report_Financial_Cost_and_Benefits_of_Establ
ishing_a_Right_to_Counsel_in_Eviction_Proceedings.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM87-FEDJ] 
(providing a cost–benefit analysis of the proposed law). 
123 See N.Y. City Local Law No. 136 (2017) (establishing annual reporting requirements). 
124 Id. 
125 See OFFICE OF CIVIL JUSTICE, N.Y.C. HUM. RESOURCES ADMIN., UNIVERSAL ACCESS 
TO LEGAL SERVICES: A REPORT ON YEAR ONE OF IMPLEMENTATION IN NEW YORK CITY (2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hra/downloads/pdf/services/civiljustice/OCJ-UA-2018-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6D6P-Q7GH] (summarizing research on first full year of implementation of New 
York City eviction representation program); STAVE ET AL., supra note 121, at 5 (analyzing the impact 
of NYIFUP). 
126 See supra Section I.B. 
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challenges to the timeliness127 and adequacy of the notice,128 while others 
involve the way in which the notice was sent to the individual.129 As discussed 
in Part I, the Supreme Court analyzes notice claims under Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust, a 1950 decision holding that the government must 
provide notice that is “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections.”130 
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s relatively stable notice jurisprudence, 
innovations are nonetheless underway. Changes in technology are raising new 
questions about how notice can be provided. For decades, transmitting notice 
by mail has been the standard, constitutionally sound practice,131 but new 
 
127 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing plaintiffs’ 
claims that a social services agency failed to provide timely and adequate notice of public assistance, 
food stamps, and Medicaid determinations); Doston v. Duffy, 732 F. Supp. 857, 872 (N.D. Ill. 1988) 
(finding to be timely a notice that is mailed at least ten days before the effective date of the proposed 
termination or suspension of benefits). 
128 See, e.g., Henry v. Gross, 803 F.2d 757, 766 (2d Cir. 1986) (defining “adequate” notice and 
describing its purpose as providing an individual with sufficient information to defend his or her 
interests); Doston, 732 F. Supp. at 872-73 (holding that a notice is inadequate if it is “unintelligible, 
confusing, or misleading” or does not “meaningfully inform” the recipient of his or her rights); Ortiz v. 
Eichler, 616 F. Supp. 1046, 1061 (D. Del. 1985) (explaining that in the welfare context “[a]t a minimum, 
due process requires the agency to explain, in terms comprehensible to the claimant, exactly what the 
agency proposes to do and why the agency is taking this action”), aff ’d, 794 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986). 
129 See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 230 (2006) (deeming notice by mail to be 
insufficient in a case involving seizure of house due to delinquent payment of taxes where “the 
government’s knowledge that notice pursuant to the normal procedure was ineffective triggered an 
obligation on the government’s part to take additional steps to effect notice”); Dusenbery v. United 
States, 534 U.S. 161, 168-69 (2002) (finding no due process violation where notice of forfeiture was 
sent by certified mail and placed in a newspaper); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 
791, 800 (1983) (“Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum 
constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property 
interests of any party, whether unlettered or well versed in commercial practice, if its name and 
address are reasonably ascertainable.”); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 453 (1982) (ruling that 
solely posting notice of eviction action on the door of an apartment in a public housing unit violated 
due process); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 210-11 (1962) (holding that publication 
in a newspaper and posted notices were inadequate to apprise a property owner of condemnation 
proceedings when his name and address were readily ascertainable). 
130 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). As the Court later 
explained, “assessing the adequacy of a particular form of notice requires balancing the ‘interest of 
the State’ against ‘the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” 
Jones, 547 U.S. at 229 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314). 
131 The Supreme Court has long recognized that transmitting notice via mail satisfies due 
process. See, e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 462 U.S. at 800 (“Notice by mail or other means as 
certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will 
adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party, whether unlettered or well versed in 
commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable.”); Greene, 456 U.S. at 453  
(holding that posting notice of eviction action on the door of an apartment in a public housing unit 
violates due process); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319 (“[T]he mails today are recognized as an efficient and 
inexpensive means of communication.”). 
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methods of communication are creating new opportunities for conveying 
notice in ways that are potentially faster, cheaper, more effective, and less 
administratively burdensome.132 
Administrative agencies are now experimenting with various forms of 
electronic notice, such as transmitting notice by email, text message, online 
portal, or some combination of these options. The federal Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as food stamps) 
provides an illuminating example of this trend. SNAP is one of the nation’s 
largest public benefit programs, with over forty million Americans currently 
receiving some amount of nutrition assistance.133 Because food stamps, like 
many other public benefits, are considered “property” under the Due Process 
Clause,134 the government must provide notice of any denial or termination 
of a household’s benefits.135 The federal food stamp statute, which established 
the program and imposes obligations on state administrators, makes only 
limited reference to “notice,”136 and the federal implementing regulations 
focus on the timeliness and adequacy of the notice that is provided.137 Aside 
 
Of course, sending notice by mail is not always constitutionally sound. See, e.g., Robinson v. 
Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that notice by mail regarding forfeiture of an 
automobile connected to crime was inadequate when notice was mailed to the individual’s home at a 
time that the government knew that the individual was incarcerated); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 
U.S. 141, 146 (1956) (holding that notice of foreclosure by mail and publication was inadequate when 
government was aware that the property owner was mentally incompetent and did not have a guardian). 
132 See, e.g., Ehrlich, supra note 62, at 2165 (“Many notice plans now include a social media 
component, and most courts allow parties to provide publication notice using targeted social media banner 
ads.” (footnote omitted)); Claire M. Specht, Note, Text Message Service of Process—No LOL Matter: Does 
Text Message Service of Process Comport with Due Process?, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1929, 1931 (2012) (noting that 
“[s]ervice of process by text message offers many advantages,” including efficiency, cost-effectiveness, ease, 
and accessibility). See generally Christine P. Bartholomew, E-Notice, 68 DUKE L.J. 217 (2018) (discussing 
new forms of notice in class-action litigation). 
133 See Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation and Costs, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 
FOOD & NUTRITION SERV. (Feb. 2, 2019), https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/pd/SNAPsummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KP8-CL3Q]. 
134 See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985) (“Food-stamp benefits, like the welfare benefits 
at issue in Goldberg v. Kelly, ‘are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive 
them.’ Such entitlements are appropriately treated as a form of ‘property’ protected by the Due 
Process Clause . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
135 See id. (“[T]he procedures that are employed in determining whether an individual may 
continue to participate in the [food stamp] program must comply with the commands of the 
Constitution.”). Courts have considered numerous due process challenges to food stamp notices. 
E.g., Banks v. Trainor, 525 F.2d 837, 838 (7th Cir. 1975); Barry v. Corrigan, 79 F. Supp. 3d 712, 720 
(E.D. Mich. 2015), aff ’d 834 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2016); Febus v. Gallant, 866 F. Supp. 45, 46 (D. Mass. 
1994); Ortiz v. Eichler, 616 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (D. Del. 1985), aff ’d 794 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986); 
Dingle v. Lam, 434 F. Supp. 1173, 1175 (D. Haw. 1977). 
136 See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) (2012) (outlining requirements of a state plan of operation, which does 
not itself mandate any notice of adverse agency action but merely assumes that a hearing request by a 
household aggrieved by a state agency’s action will be preceded by “individual notice of agency action”). 
137 See 7 C.F.R. § 273.13 (2019) (establishing requirements for notice of adverse agency action). 
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from a few references in the regulations to termination or denial notices being 
“mailed” to the household,138 there are no instructions concerning how notice 
is to be transmitted to participants in the program. 
Not surprisingly, since the beginning of the program, state agencies have 
provided food stamp notices by mail. In recent years, however, agencies have 
sought waivers to allow them to shift from mailing paper notices to issuing 
notices electronically.139 The federal government began approving these 
waiver requests in 2011, allowing states to issue notices to households using 
an online account on a secure network or portal and to cease mailing paper 
notices to a household’s physical address.140 Then, in late 2017, the federal 
government went one step further, eliminating the need for states to obtain 
a waiver, instead making the e-notice option available to all states, provided 
that certain conditions are met.141 
The shift to electronic transmission of notices is being driven not by courts 
engaging in the type of interest-balancing required by due process doctrine, 
but rather by government agencies employing a similar balancing approach.142 
According to the federal government, it changed its policy concerning notice 
transmission for two reasons. First, it cited “the positive data reported from 
currently approved e-notice waivers,” noting that since the first e-notice 
waivers were approved, “stakeholders including State agencies, SNAP 
households, and advocacy groups, have reported that e-notices may provide 
several administrative and customer service related benefits,”143 including 
“reduced printing and mailing costs, faster receipt of notices, fewer lost notices 
and easier access to them within the portal, and decreases in returned mail for 
 
138 See, e.g., id. § 273.13(a)(1) (referring to notice as timely if it “includes at least 10 days from the 
date the notice is mailed to the date upon which the action becomes effective”); id. § 273.10(g)(1)(ii) 
(referring to an action “taken within 30 days of the date the notice of denial was mailed”). 
139 See Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, Food & Nutrition Servs., Electronic 
Notice Waivers and Options 1 (Nov. 3, 2017), https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/Memo-Electronic-Notice-and-Other-Options-11317.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/855D-MXCK] [hereinafter Memo on Electronic Notice] (noting the availability of 
e-notice waivers, “which allow States to provide designated noticed to households through an online 
account on a secure website or portal instead of mailing paper notices to physical addresses”). 
140 Id. at 1. 
141 Id. at 1-2. The notice policy did not include the use of text messages as a substitute for 
mailed notices. See id. at 2 (“Text messages differ from email and mail correspondence in important 
ways, the most important of which is that the sender does not get feedback (returned mail or 
undeliverable email) indicating if the recipient did not receive the information that was sent.”). 
142 This cost–benefit analysis is similar to the analysis employed by courts when considering 
whether notice complies with the Due Process Clause. See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229 (2006) 
(“[A]ssessing the adequacy of a particular form of notice requires balancing the ‘interest of the State’ 
against ‘the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” (quoting 
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950))). 
143 Memo on Electronic Notice, supra note 139, at 1. 
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households who lack a fixed permanent address.”144 Second, the federal 
government highlighted its “re-evaluation of the regulations regarding notice 
issuance in light of current technology.”145 
The federal government has made clear that this kind of procedural 
innovation depends on data concerning its costs and benefits. For example, it 
has declined to give blanket approval to notice via text message, stating that 
state agencies wishing to use solely text messages “must continue to request 
waiver approval and include appropriate plans to evaluate the impact of the 
proposed alternative procedure.”146 Thus, the federal government has 
demonstrated its willingness not to lock in certain forms of notice and to 
continue to be open to new ideas based on evidence of how they operate. 
C.  Active Judging 
A third example of non-court-driven procedural reform focuses on the 
role of the judge when court proceedings involve one or more unrepresented 
litigants. Civil courts in the United States have been suffering from a “pro se 
crisis” for decades.147 Even when basic human needs are at issue—for 
example, shelter, sustenance, health, and child custody—a high percentage of 
people are unable to afford to hire an attorney to represent them.148 The 
 
144 Id. But see SNAP Policy Update: DTA Pilot on e-Notification for SNAP and Cash Clients; Update 
List of DTA Local Office Contact Information, MASS. LEGAL SERVS. (Jan. 14, 2014), 
https://www.masslegalservices.org/content/snap-policy-update-dta-pilot-e-notification-snap-and-
cash-clients-update-list-dta-local [https://perma.cc/78TJ-67CB] (describing problems with 
Massachusetts’s e-notification system, such as lack of reliable Internet access, language barriers, and 
Internet safety concerns). 
145 Memo on Electronic Notice, supra note 139, at 1. 
146 Id. at 2. 
147 See, e.g., JOY MOSES, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, GROUNDS FOR OBJECTION: CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S PRO SE CRISIS AND HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF 
UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS 3 (2011), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2011/06/pdf/objection.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6ZT-Q437] (noting that “[t]he 
number of low and moderate-income litigants representing themselves in civil matters has increased in 
recent decades” and naming this trend a “Pro Se Crisis”); Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to 
Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 883 (2009) (“In many courts that handle housing, 
bankruptcy, immigration, small claims, and family matters, pro se litigants are not the exception but 
the rule, and the recent economic downturn has increased their presence.”); Jessica K. Steinberg, 
Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 749-51 (2015) (reporting that up 
to ninety percent of litigants in certain state systems appear unrepresented and concluding that “the 
pro se crisis is immense”). 
148 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (104-REVISED) 1 (2010), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_
104_revised_final_aug_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/DMD4-RUPM] (discussing need for government-
funded legal representation for low-income individuals appearing in proceedings involving “basic human 
needs”); LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS 
OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 30 (2017), 
https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/WS4X-
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absence of lawyers can undermine the American adversarial model of 
adjudication, which relies on the parties, through their legal representatives, 
to present evidence and make legal arguments.149 Without lawyers 
representing parties, there are real questions about whether court proceedings 
can be fundamentally fair. 
Due process doctrine and theory have not historically been focused on 
how judges run proceedings in the courtroom.150 To be sure, the Supreme 
Court has considered numerous cases in which pro se parties in civil matters 
sought a due process right to appointed counsel.151 However, the Court in 
those cases did not consider the role of judges in ensuring the fairness of the 
proceedings, with one recent and significant exception: the Court’s 2011 
decision in Turner v. Rogers.152 
The Court’s decision in Turner is a small but important step toward 
connecting the requirements of due process with the role of the judge in cases 
involving pro se litigants. In Turner, the Court, applying Mathews, rejected 
the petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to a government-appointed 
lawyer under the Due Process Clause because he was in danger of being 
incarcerated due to unpaid child support payments.153 However, the Court 
also held that the state must provide “‘substitute procedural safeguards,’ 
which, if employed together, can significantly reduce the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of liberty.”154 The Court identified a handful of alternative 
procedures, each of which implicates the role of the judge: giving pro se 
defendants more information about the “critical issue” to be decided at the 
hearing, using a form to collect information about that issue, giving 
defendants an opportunity to respond to questions about the issue at the 
hearing, and making an express finding on that issue.155 Thus, in the specific 
 
GJNA] (“[L]ow-income Americans receive inadequate or no professional legal help for 86% of their civil 
legal problems in a given year.”). 
149 See generally Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
1031 (1975) (acknowledging the existing imperfections of the American adversarial system); Norman 
W. Spaulding, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary System Values, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
1377 (2008) (opining that the adversarial system itself does not create a problem but that the failure 
of lawyers within that system does). 
150 The Court has, of course, explored the related but distinct question of judicial bias. See 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (holding that due process requires a 
judge’s recusal when the likelihood of bias “is too high to be constitutionally tolerable” (quoting 
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975))); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (explaining 
that due process guarantees “an absence of actual bias” on the part of the judge). 
151 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
152 564 U.S. 431, 435 (2011). 
153 See id. at 444-48. 
154 Id. at 447 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)) (citation omitted). 
155 Id. at 447-48. 
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proceedings considered in Turner, pro se individuals have a due process right 
to a judge who does not sit passively at the hearing.156 
The academic literature has seen a similar increase in attention to the role 
of the judge. At the height of the due process revolution, scholars paid little 
attention to the role of the judge as a component of procedural due process. 
For example, in his seminal article on what type of hearing the Due Process 
Clause requires, Judge Henry Friendly identified eleven “elements” of a fair 
hearing, ranking them in order of importance.157 Aside from a requirement 
that the judge be unbiased,158 Friendly omitted any reference to how the judge 
actually presides over the proceedings.159 Although he did argue for an 
“investigatory model” rather than an adversarial model for certain hearings, 
Friendly did not even suggest that such an approach to judging might be 
required by the Due Process Clause.160 
Even without clear direction from due process doctrine, ideas about the 
role of the judge are changing. With the support of a growing body of 
academic and policy literature,161 courts are experimenting with an “active 
 
156 Id. The impact of this aspect of Turner’s holding is unclear. See, e.g., Ashley Robertson, Note, 
Revisiting Turner v. Rogers, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1541, 1541 (2017) (arguing that Turner’s “substitute 
procedural safeguards do not adequately offset the risk of wrongful incarceration”). 
157 See Friendly, supra note 2, at 1279-95. 
158 Id. at 1279-80. 
159 Id. at 1278-95. 
160 Id. at 1289-91. 
161 See, e.g., RICHARD ZORZA, THE SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT: DESIGNED FROM THE 
GROUND UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE WITHOUT LAWYERS 109-12 (2002) (suggesting ways for 
judges to facilitate pro se litigation); Rebecca A. Albrecht et al., Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving 
Self-Represented Litigants, 42 JUDGES’ J., Winter 2003, at 16, 45-46 (recommending that judges 
prepare more intensely, provide more guidelines, and accept more informal evidence and testimony 
in cases involving pro se litigants); see also Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of the 
Judge in Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York City’s Housing Court, 3 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 659, 670-74 (2006) (recommending a survey of the strategies 
of judges who successfully mitigate difficulties faced by pro se litigants in New York City’s Housing 
Court); Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 
1227, 1233-34 (2010) (arguing that court reform would be more effective than increasing funding for 
appointed counsel); Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding 
and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 987-88 (2012) (surveying the range of bottom-up 
pro se court reform); Carpenter, supra note 15, at 649, 651 (noting that “[a] critical mass of scholars 
and experts now argue that court reform, including reform of the judge’s role, could help solve the 
pro se crisis in civil justice”); Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the 
Changing Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 367, 368-69 (2008) (focusing 
on the changing judicial role in cases with unrepresented litigants); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Judicial 
Abdication and Equal Access to the Civil Justice System, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 325, 330 (2010) 
(arguing that failing to address the lack of access to justice for the poor is judicial abdication of the 
central mission of justice); Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access 
to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 969, 970 (2004) (applying a market perspective to argue that a changing judicial role would 
be more effective than increasing funding for counsel and demanding more pro bono hours of 
lawyers); Rhode, supra note 147, at 885 (explaining how the concerns of judges regarding the 
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judging”162 approach to legal proceedings where one or both of the parties are 
unrepresented by counsel.163 There is no universally recognized definition for 
“active judging,”164 nor is there much guidance for judges seeking to take on 
an active role in pro se litigation.165 In the leading scholarly treatment of 
active judging, Anna Carpenter explains that it typically operates in one or 
more of three “dimensions”: accommodating pro se litigants by adjusting 
procedures, explaining the law and hearing process, and eliciting information 
to develop the record.166 These judicial interventions are aimed at promoting 
fairness for pro se litigants, improving the quality of judicial rulings, and 
increasing the efficiency of court proceedings, while at the same time 
maintaining the judge’s neutrality and impartiality.167 
The recent uptick in active judging is not being driven by changes in due 
process doctrine. As a general matter, due process case law continues to say 
little about the judge’s role in cases involving pro se litigants.168 In fact, many 
cases hold that judges have no obligation to treat pro se litigants any 
differently than represented parties.169 And while experimentation with 
active judging resembles the kinds of procedural safeguards that the Supreme 
Court held in Turner to be required by the Due Process Clause, neither the 
Supreme Court nor lower courts have extended this aspect of Turner’s holding 
beyond the proceedings at issue in that case. 
 
appearance of impartiality have inhibited potential reforms); Jeffrey Selbin, Jeanne Charn, Anthony 
Alfieri & Stephen Wizner, Service Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice: Greiner and 
Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45, 60-61 (2012) (describing how court 
simplification efforts have become a major feature of reforms). 
162 Anna Carpenter explains, “Reform proposals go by different names, such as ‘active judging,’ 
‘affirmative judging,’ ‘engaged judging,’ and ‘engaged neutrality,’ but all refer to a model of judging 
that sets aside traditional judicial passivity in favor of some form of judicial intervention or activity 
to assist people without counsel.” Carpenter, supra note 15, at 649-50. Like Carpenter, this Article 
uses the term “active judging” to refer to these reforms. 
163 See Carpenter, supra note 15, at 665 (“On the ground, while many judges likely hew to the 
passive norm, limited evidence suggests some judges are beginning to alter their practices in 
response to the rise of pro se litigation.”); Jessica K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role 
Confusion in “Small Case” Civil Justice, 2016 BYU L. REV. 899, 937-43 (arguing that judicial departures 
from adversarial procedures are widespread). 
164 See Carpenter, supra note 15, at 656 (finding, based on an empirical study, that “there is no 
single model of, or approach to, active judging”). 
165 See id. at 663-64 (“[W]hile some authorities have taken a permissive stance on active 
judging, there is little in the way of specific guidance on the scope, nature, and objectives of a judge’s 
role in pro se litigation.”). 
166 Id. at 667-72. 
167 Id. at 662-63 (discussing arguments in support of active judging); see also Barton, supra note 161, at 
1273 (discussing how even relatively modest reforms can impact the pro se litigant’s experience positively). 
168 See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 163, at 927 (“[O]nly a few dozen opinions address the 
intersection of pro se litigation and adversary norms.”). 
169 See, e.g., id. at 927 (listing cases where courts emphasized “the norm of party control”). 
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Still, it is impossible to ignore the links between active judging and 
procedural due process. When proponents describe the goals of active 
judging, they typically refer to ensuring fair procedures, fair hearings, and 
fair opportunities for pro se litigants to participate in the proceedings.170 
Similar language appears in a recent revision to the Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct that arguably authorizes active judging.171 These invocations of 
“fairness” sound in the Constitution’s due process guarantee.172 Indeed, that 
is what enabled the Supreme Court in Turner to find a constitutional violation 
where a judge sat back passively and did not make the kind of interventions 
in the proceedings that would have afforded the pro se litigant a process that 
comported with due process.173 
Along with the recent increase in active judging have come efforts to measure 
its impact. A growing number of scholars are beginning to engage in this 
empirical research.174 Although there is currently limited evidence of the costs 
and benefits of specific active judging practices, studies are aiming to reveal the 
impact on pro se litigants, judges, and the civil justice system as a whole.175 
 
170 See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 15, at 658 (“Central to th[e] vision [of justice reform given 
the pro se crisis] is an active judge, one who maintains impartiality while promoting access and 
fairness for pro se parties by making procedural adjustments, explaining law and the hearing process, 
and eliciting information to develop the record.”). 
171 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 r. 2.2 cmt.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) 
(“It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se 
litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.” (emphasis added)). The ABA report on 
the rule change uses similar language. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA JOINT COMMISSION TO EVALUATE 
THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 47 (2007), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judicialethics/house_report.authcheckda
m.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PZ4-8VZR]. (“[B]y leveling the playing field, . . . judges ensure that pro 
se litigants receive the fair hearing to which they are entitled.” (emphasis added)). 
172 See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The essence of 
procedural due process is a fair hearing.”); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“Whatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of the phrase ‘due process of law,’ 
there can be no doubt that it embraces the fundamental conception of a fair trial . . . .”). 
173 Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 448 (2011). 
174 See Carpenter, supra note 15, at 684-707 (summarizing the results of a study of a majority pro 
se court where controlling law supports active judging); see also id. at 672 (“We do not have sufficient 
empirical data to make categorical statements about how judges behave in pro se cases, let alone 
studies that tell us about the effectiveness of particular active judging practices.”). See generally Anna 
E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Studying the “New” Civil Judges, 
2018 WIS. L. REV. 249 (calling for more research focused on state civil courts and judges). 
175 See Carpenter, supra note 15, at 672 (“Existing research suggests that jurisdictions, courts, 
and individual judges differ in meaningful ways in how they apply the law and enforce procedure 
. . . [when] they engage with pro se litigants.”); Carpenter et al., supra note 174, at 252 (“The data 
[scholars] do have about state courts point to a radical and ongoing transformation in the civil justice 
system, a transformation both easy to observe and largely overlooked.”). 
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III. REUNIFYING AND REVIVING DUE PROCESS THROUGH DIALOGUE 
The innovations described in Part II are just a few examples of the 
procedural experimentation that is currently underway. These innovations 
are taking root in different jurisdictions and across unrelated legal contexts, 
and experimentation in one place is inspiring similar reforms elsewhere.176 
Despite their diversity, the innovations share three important characteristics: 
they involve foundational elements of procedural due process (notice, the 
right to counsel, and the role of the judge), they are not the product of due 
process litigation, and they are portrayed as mandated by due process. Thus, 
they are simultaneously all about due process while also disconnected from 
due process theory and doctrine. 
What do these innovations mean for the future of procedural due process? 
Should due process doctrine evolve to include innovations like these? If so, 
how? Drawing on two fundamental aspects of procedural due process—the 
flexibility and adaptability that is deeply rooted in American due process 
jurisprudence and the Supreme Court’s modern approach to procedural due 
process claims—this Part argues for revival and reunification of due process 
through what I call a “dialogic” approach to procedural due process. Section A 
identifies the growing divergence between procedural innovations that are not 
prompted by litigation, on the one hand, and the relatively stagnant due 
process theory and doctrine, on the other hand. Then, drawing on the flexible 
nature of due process and the Supreme Court’s modern approach to evaluating 
due process claims, Section B argues that this divergence can be reconciled 
through dialogue between due process doctrine and the innovations that are 
underway. This Part then concludes with Section C, which anticipates and 
responds to objections and counterarguments that may be triggered by a 
dialogic approach to procedural due process. In sum, this Part offers both a 
justification and a roadmap for reinvigorating procedural due process doctrine 
at a time when non-court-driven experimentation is on the rise. 
 
176 See, e.g., Matt Krupnick, “People Will Sign Anything”: How Legal Odds Are Stacked Against the 
Evicted, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/24/evicted-
tenants-landlords-lawyers-disparity-housing-crisis [https://perma.cc/5FAV-BQNF] (reporting that 
since New York City adopted right-to-counsel legislation for eviction cases in 2017, “San Francisco, 
Philadelphia and Baltimore all are testing or considering right-to-counsel programs, as are smaller 
cities such as Santa Rosa, California”). There are numerous organizations, coalitions, and working 
groups focused on bringing the strategies and lessons of right-to-counsel advocacy to jurisdictions 
with no such programs. See, e.g., NAT’L COALITION FOR CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS., 
http://civilrighttocounsel.org [https://perma.cc/7JXG-JWEJ] (last visited Feb. 22, 2019) (advocating 
for “a right to counsel in key areas like child custody, guardianship of adults, termination of parental 
rights, and incarceration for failure to pay criminal fees and fines”). 
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A. Divergence 
As discussed in Part II, there is a growing divergence between what courts say 
that the Due Process Clause requires and the procedural safeguards that are 
actually available to affected individuals. Indeed, in some instances, the procedures 
that are now available are ones that courts have held, either explicitly or implicitly, 
not to be required by due process.177 In other instances, the new procedures have 
never before been ordered by courts in constitutional litigation.178 
Although government officials are free to—and often do—provide more 
procedural protections than are required by the Constitution,179 the growing 
divergence is nonetheless noteworthy. First, some of the new procedural 
innovations are variations on bedrock elements of procedural due process: the 
right to counsel, the right to timely and adequate notice, and the role of the 
judge at a hearing. But even though they directly implicate fundamental 
aspects of procedural due process, courts are not participating in these 
developments. And second, these additional procedural safeguards are 
presented and discussed by proponents as if the procedures spring directly 
from the right to due process.180 Some even claim that the procedures are 
mandated by due process, despite clear precedent to the contrary.181 Thus, 
even though the courts’ interpretation of the Due Process Clause is not 
driving these innovations, they are nonetheless portrayed as synonymous 
with the Constitution’s due process guarantee. 
This kind of divergence is also noteworthy because of the potential for 
perceived unfairness. For every individual who benefits from these procedural 
innovations, there are others who are on the outside looking in. Due process 
is all about fairness,182 and having procedural safeguards vary depending on 
 
177 See, e.g., supra Section II.A (discussing the emergence of right-to-counsel programs in 
immigration deportation proceedings and eviction proceedings). 
178 See, e.g., supra Sections II.B–C (discussing the use of active judging and electronic 
transmission of constitutionally required notices). 
179 See, e.g., ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 78, at § 17.8(i) n.70 (“[T]he state may exceed due 
process minimum requirements when creating procedures to protect liberty or property interests.”); 
see also PIERCE, supra note 33, at 736 (“Agencies almost invariably provide procedures greater than 
those required by the APA when they engage in informal adjudication.”); Vermeule, supra note 31, 
at 1924-25 (noting that agencies often voluntarily provide more than “the bare-bones procedure for 
informal adjudication” required by the Administrative Procedure Act). 
180 See, e.g., supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the use of “due process” language 
with respect to right-to-counsel efforts). 
181 See, e.g., supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
182 See, e.g., ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 78, § 17.8(g) (“The essential guarantee of the 
due process clause is that of fairness.”); Mashaw, supra note 63, at 52-54 (discussing the importance 
of “equality of treatment” in the realm of adjudicatory procedure); Redish & Marshall, supra note 
32, at 483-85 (discussing the importance of fairness and equality in procedural due process); see also 
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
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where a case is being adjudicated can seem arbitrary, if not explicitly unfair.183 
For example, indigent, detained noncitizens appearing in immigration court 
in New York City are automatically appointed free counsel if they cannot 
afford it, while similarly situated respondents in other parts of the country 
are on their own.184 Similarly, pro se litigants appearing in court systems that 
have adopted active judging practices can rely on the judge’s assistance in 
court, while pro se litigants involved in the same types of legal actions in 
other jurisdictions receive no such help from the presiding judges.185 The 
same dynamic can exist in the notice context, too, where the method and 
speed of notice delivery can vary depending on where one lives.186 
That said, the Constitution does not mandate a uniform set of procedural 
safeguards across all jurisdictions187—it merely sets a baseline below which 
the available procedures cannot fall.188 Yet the growing divergence between 
due process doctrine and the procedures available on the ground raises 
important questions about the future of procedural due process and the role 
of courts and doctrine. Can courts expand the demands of procedural due 
process to include these types of innovations? If so, how? The following 
Section takes up those questions, arguing for a dialogic relationship between 
court-driven and non-court-driven procedures that is consistent with 
longstanding due process theory and doctrine. 
 
(noting that due process “[r]epresent[s] a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and 
more particularly between the individual and government”). 
183 See, e.g., Randy Lee, Twenty-Five Years After Goldberg v. Kelly: Traveling from the Right Spot 
on the Wrong Road to the Wrong Place, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 863, 984 (1994) (“Nothing . . . invites the 
impression of arbitrariness more than treating similarly situated people differently . . . .”); see also id. 
at 985 (explaining that when procedural safeguards vary within the context of public benefit programs, 
“the recipient of benefits will often believe first, that favoritism, rather than rule, fuels the distribution 
of procedural protection, and second, that had the recipient received the same process afforded others, 
the result in his case would have been different”); cf. Resnik, supra note 85, at 85 (discussing 
intralitigant inequities and the role of due process in the context of criminal adjudications). 
184 See supra Section II.A. 
185 See supra Section II.C. 
186 See supra Section II.B. 
187 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power “[t]o establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization” (emphasis added)), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting 
States from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”). 
188 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1982) (“In its Fourteenth 
Amendment, our Constitution imposes on the States the standards necessary to ensure that judicial 
proceedings are fundamentally fair. A wise public policy, however, may require that higher standards 
be adopted than those minimally tolerable under the Constitution.”); ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra 
note 78, § 17.8(i) n.70 (“[T]he state may exceed due process minimum requirements when creating 
procedures to protect liberty or property interests.”). 
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B. Dialogue 
Due process doctrine is well situated for a dialogic engagement with non-
court-driven procedural innovations. This Section explores the conditions 
that make due process open to dialogue and sketches what a dialogic approach 
to procedural due process could look like with respect to the procedural 
innovations discussed in Part II. 
1. Conditions for Dialogue 
The Due Process Clause is different from other rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, “due process 
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands.”189 Indeed, “[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept 
of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable 
situation.”190 Thus, due process rules must be tailored to the procedural 
context in which they operate, and they must be open to revision based on 
changing fact and circumstances.191 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the requirements of due 
process may evolve over time. Over a century ago, the Court rejected the 
argument that the Framers’ view of the Due Process Clause limits the scope 
of procedures required by the Constitution.192 As Justice Felix Frankfurter 
later explained, the concept of due process is, “perhaps, the least frozen 
concept of our law—the least confined to history and the most absorptive of 
powerful social standards of a progressive society.”193 Indeed, procedural 
 
189 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). According to Morrissey, this proposition “has 
been said so often by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority.” Id. The Court 
has quoted this language numerous times since Morrissey. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 
209, 224 (2005); Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. 
Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 n.15 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). 
190 Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); see also 
Farina, supra note 83, at 268 (“Due process jurisprudence has long claimed a special fluidity and 
sensitivity to context.”). 
191 See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571-72 (1974) (explaining, in the context of prison 
disciplinary procedures, that due process requirements are “not graven in stone” and may be revisited 
based on changing circumstances); see also Parkin, supra note 11, at 1360-65 (arguing that the Due Process 
Clause requires procedural rules to be reevaluated in light of changing facts and circumstances). 
192 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884) (expressing fear that establishing a 
fixed definition of due process “stamp[s] upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to 
the laws of the Medes and Persians”). 
193 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter 
wrote previously, 
“[D]ue process” cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula. 
Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more 
particularly between the individual and government, “due process” is compounded of 
history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of 
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rules, “even ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary notions of due 
process.”194 For these reasons, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that “‘due 
process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed 
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”195 
The Supreme Court’s modern approach to procedural due process 
arguably reflects this commitment to flexibility in the face of changing facts 
and circumstances. Since 1976, the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test has 
provided the analytical framework for determining what procedures are due 
when due process rights are triggered.196 Mathews requires courts to 
scrutinize and weigh three factors—the private interest at stake, the risk of 
erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards, and the government’s interest—to determine whether 
existing procedures satisfy the Due Process Clause.197 And since 1950, the 
related but analytically distinct question of whether the government provides 
sufficient notice of a constitutional deprivation has been guided by the 
Court’s decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, which asks 
whether the notice provided was “reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”198 
Both the Mathews and the Mullane tests are highly fact dependent. They 
reject one-size-fits-all approaches to procedural due process, instead directing 
courts to consider the facts and circumstances of the specific procedural setting 
in which the due process challenge arises.199 Mathews and Mullane also root the 
analysis in the present, giving little explicit weight to historical or customary 
 
the democratic faith which we profess. Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It 
is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably 
involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with 
the unfolding of the process. 
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
194 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 630 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring). Although 
history creates a strong presumption of continued validity, “the Court has the authority under the 
[Fourteenth] Amendment to examine even traditionally accepted procedures and declare them 
invalid.” Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 
(1819) (“[The] constitution [was] intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be 
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” (emphasis omitted)). 
195 Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)). 
196 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319. 
197 Id. at 335. 
198 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
199 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 (embracing the notion that due process “calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situations demands” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 481 (1972))); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (instructing courts to give “due regard for the practicalities 
and peculiarities of the case” when evaluating whether the constitutional requirements have been met). 
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procedural practices.200 In theory—if not always in practice201—Mathews and 
Mullane open the door to reevaluation of procedural due process precedents when 
changes in the underlying facts and circumstances bear upon the factors that 
courts must consider when evaluating challenges to existing procedures.202 
Yet this focus on the facts has frustrated attempts to push due process 
doctrine in new directions. By asking courts to weigh the costs and benefits 
of procedural safeguards that are by definition not currently in place, the 
modern approach to procedural due process requires plaintiffs in due process 
litigation to produce information that is typically unavailable.203 Even when 
courts allow cases to proceed to discovery, there is often no way for plaintiffs 
to marshal the evidence necessary to prove that current procedures violate 
the Due Process Clause. Indeed, because plaintiffs usually seek procedural 
safeguards that the government has not previously implemented or even 
considered,204 it can be impossible for plaintiffs to produce the evidence 
demanded by the modern approach to procedural due process. 
2. Dialogic Due Process 
The kinds of procedural innovations described in Part II can offer a way 
out of this doctrinal dead end. These innovations create an opportunity for 
dialogue between the courts that review due process claims, on the one hand, 
and the procedural systems in which these innovations are taking place, on the 
other. The innovations are often accompanied by rigorous and robust data 
collection and analysis. They are therefore generating new ideas for procedural 
safeguards as well as the type of evidence that Mathews and Mullane demand. 
 
200 See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 63, at 55 (noting that the Mathews Court “could [not] discover 
guiding authority in prior administrative practice, which [was] based on the now discredited notion that 
social welfare benefits are subject to discretionary divestiture”); see also Bartholomew, supra note 132, at 
224-28 (explaining that the Mullane Court adopted a case-specific analysis that emphasizes flexibility). 
201 See, e.g., Parkin, supra note 11, at 1312-15 (describing a series of federal court cases involving 
debt collection procedures in which lower courts split over the question of whether the procedures 
required by the Due Process Clause could be reevaluated based on changed facts and circumstances); 
see also Bartholomew, supra note 132, at 234-59 (summarizing empirical research on class-action 
notices finding that most judges have not embraced new forms of notice). 
202 See Parkin, supra note 11, at 1360-65 (arguing that due process procedures can be reevaluated 
under Mathews in light of changing facts and circumstances); see also Bartholomew, supra note 132, at 260-
65 (arguing that notice requirements can be reevaluated under Mullane in light of new technologies). 
203 See Resnik, supra note 85, at 158 (“Neither judges nor litigants can identify with any rigor 
the actual costs of various procedures, let alone model (or know) the impact in terms of false 
positives and negatives produced by the same, more, or different processes . . . . While one can state 
the equation, one cannot do the math because the data are missing.”). 
204 Notably, this was not the case in Mullane, where the defendant had actually provided the 
sought-after notice (mailed notice to known beneficiaries of the trust) in the past. See Mullane, 339 
U.S. at 319 (“[T]he fact that the trust company has been able to give mailed notice to known 
beneficiaries at the time the common trust fund was established is persuasive that postal notification 
at the time of accounting would not seriously burden the plan.”). 
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The right-to-counsel innovations discussed in Section II.A demonstrate the 
potential for dialogue between non-court-driven innovation and due process 
doctrine. The jurisdictions that have implemented a right to counsel in 
deportation and eviction proceedings are generating exactly the kind of data that 
has been missing or insufficient in prior right-to-counsel litigation. Plaintiffs in 
those lawsuits had little difficulty producing evidence of the first Mathews factor 
(the private interest at stake), but it was much harder to show the risk of error 
when individuals proceed pro se, the probable value of an appointed lawyer, and 
the cost to the government of a right-to-counsel program. Now, however, the 
right-to-counsel experiments make it possible to assess the actual value of the 
Mathews factors based on what is happening day in and day out in jurisdictions 
where this kind of experimentation is taking place. 
The use of electronic notice is also creating an opportunity for dialogue.205 
When government agencies experiment with forms of notice that are 
different from the paper mailings that were used for decades, it becomes 
possible to evaluate the impact of those changes. The government can 
measure whether electronic notices result in fewer mailing problems, whether 
notices are received in a more timely manner, whether electronic notice is 
administratively feasible, and whether it is less costly than printing and 
mailing paper notices. While it may not be possible to answer all of these 
questions, the implementation of new forms of notice can generate data and 
information that is relevant to the cost–benefit analysis. Thus, it lays the 
groundwork for a dialogue between the agencies that have adopted electronic 
notice and the courts that may have occasion to rule on a due process 
challenge to another agency’s method of providing notice. 
Finally, a similar opportunity also exists with respect to the rise of active 
judging in litigation involving pro se parties.206 Courts that implement active 
judging can measure its impact on litigants, judges, and the court system. 
Evidence of active judging’s effect on error rates and administrative costs is 
particularly important, as there is no other way to gather that kind of evidence 
without actually implementing such a program. 
The idea that a constitutional right can be informed and shaped by 
changing facts and circumstances is not a novel one. For example, the 
Supreme Court has recognized the evolving nature of the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures”207 and the 
 
205 See supra Section II.B. 
206 See supra Section II.C. 
207 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (explaining 
that courts must look to an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” which evolves over time 
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967))). 
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Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.”208 Nor 
is the concept of dialogue foreign to constitutional law; however, it is typically 
used to describe a dialogue between courts and legislatures209 or between 
government officials and affected individuals.210 
In any event, the fact-intensive nature of the Court’s modern approach to 
procedural due process makes a dialogue between bottom-up experimentation 
and due process litigation both appropriate and potentially powerful. When 
reviewing procedural due process claims, courts demand evidence of the costs 
and benefits of the procedural safeguards sought by plaintiffs. Government 
defendants typically are the main—if not only—source of evidence regarding 
the risk of error and the value and cost of additional procedures. But the kinds 
of innovations described in this Article are generating new evidence in the 
form of raw data and even expert reports, which plaintiffs can use to rebut 
defendants’ factual assertions. This new evidence may come from innovations 
occurring in other jurisdictions and perhaps even different procedural 
regimes; however, as is the case in civil litigation generally, both parties can 
advance arguments concerning the relevance and weight of the evidence. 
This dialogic approach does not guarantee that plaintiffs’ due process 
claims will succeed. But it can help plaintiffs convince judges that the costs 
and benefits may not be as clear cut as the government suggests—in other 
words, that there is a “genuine dispute as to a[] material fact” that must be 
resolved at trial.211 Ultimately, it will be up to the factfinder to decide whether 
the evidence presented by the parties tips the cost–benefit balance in favor of 
the procedural safeguards sought by plaintiffs. 
In sum, armed with evidence generated by procedural innovations, 
plaintiffs in due process litigation have an opportunity to link on-the-ground 
experimentation with due process doctrine. This kind of dialogic approach to 
due process can therefore ensure that the changes wrought by the due process 
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s are not the end of the road for the evolution 
of procedural due process. 
C. Limits and Objections 
The kind of dialogue proposed in this Article is not without its limits and 
potential objections. Ever since the due process revolution, judges, 
 
208 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (explaining that 
courts must consider “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” 
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))). 
209 See generally Liu, supra note 29. 
210 Cf. Tribe, supra note 30, at 301 (discussing the need for dialogue between the state and individuals 
whose liberty the state seeks to constrain). See generally Handler, supra note 30; Kirp, supra note 30. 
211 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
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government officials, advocates, and scholars have raised concerns about 
courts holding that the Due Process Clause requires specific procedural 
safeguards. A dialogic approach to procedural due process would encounter 
similar objections. It could be challenged for being out of step with current 
judicial reluctance to interfere with the operation of large-scale procedural 
systems. It could be attacked for entrenching a new set of procedures and 
stifling future innovation. And it could trigger fears about disrupting 
procedural systems that have been in place for decades. This Section 
addresses each of these limits and objections in turn. 
1. Inconsistent with Prevailing Judicial Mood 
One potential objection to a dialogic approach to procedural due process 
is that it is out of step with prevailing notions of the proper role of judges 
and courts. Since the due process revolution, scholars, government officials, 
and many judges themselves have questioned the legitimacy of courts 
interfering with procedural regimes designed by administrative agencies and 
court systems.212 Some criticize judicial intervention on separation-of-powers 
grounds, arguing that it is illegitimate for judges to dictate procedures to 
other governmental actors.213 Others claim that judges lack the capacity to 
identify the proper procedures in light of administrative and budgetary 
constraints.214 While the Supreme Court has made clear that the courts—not 
legislatures or administrative agencies—have the last word on whether 
 
212 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 279 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[N]ew 
experiments in carrying out a welfare program should not be frozen into our constitutional structure. 
They should be left . . . to the Congress and the legislatures that the people elect to make our laws.”). 
213 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial 
Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 637 (1982) (“[S]ince trial court remedial discretion in institutional suits 
is inevitably political in nature, it must be regarded as presumptively illegitimate.”); Robert F. Nagel, 
Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 664 (1978) 
(arguing that separation of powers principles limit the authority of federal courts to order relief 
against state institutions); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial 
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1123-24 (1996) (arguing that “separation of 
powers principles require that the answer come from the political branches” rather than the courts). 
214 See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in 
Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 807 (1990) (“Courts lack the administrative capacity to alter basic 
institutional practices directly and are constrained by both a limited constitutional mandate and a 
narrow vision of their role.”); Vermeule, supra note 31, at 1922 (arguing that judges lack “the overall 
perspective” required to fashion procedural systems); cf. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, 
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1017-18 (2004) 
(summarizing concerns about the capacity of courts and judges to reform institutions). 
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procedures comply with the Due Process Clause,215 judges reviewing due 
process claims tend to be reluctant to displace existing procedures.216 
These longstanding critiques apply with equal force to a dialogic approach 
to due process. As an initial matter, just because an innovation is feasible or 
effective in one context or jurisdiction does not mean that the Due Process 
Clause requires the procedure to be extended to others. This is related to a 
broader point about due process procedures that is also relevant here—as the 
Supreme Court has explained, “our cases have never held that improvements 
in the reliability of new procedures necessarily demonstrate the infirmity of 
those that were replaced.”217 
It is also true that government officials are typically in the best position 
to understand the relative advantages and disadvantages of procedural 
innovations. However, the Supreme Court’s modern approach to procedural 
due process is intended to account for this dynamic. If a plaintiff is able to 
produce the kinds of evidence demanded by Mathews and Mullane, then the 
court must evaluate that evidence and reach a conclusion about the 
constitutionality of the existing procedures. And while critics have assailed 
the Mathews analysis in particular for asking courts to weigh factors for which 
little evidence is typically available,218 the dialogic approach is rooted in an 
understanding that procedural experimentation will generate exactly the type 
of evidence that courts usually lack when evaluating due process claims.219 
Thus, a dialogic approach to due process enables courts to assert their role in 
the development of due process doctrine while also grounding their rulings 
in hard facts that are generated by non-court-driven procedural innovations. 
 
215 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (“The right to due 
process ‘is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee.’” (quoting Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring))). 
That said, as Adrian Vermeule has noted, administrative agencies “are now the primary frontline 
expositors and appliers of the Mathews test.” Vermeule, supra note 31, at 1891. See generally Gillian E. 
Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013). For example, federal agencies 
that have used the Mathews approach to determine which procedures to make available include the 
Environmental Protection Agency; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms; the Treasury Department; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; 
the Department of Labor; the Department of Homeland Security; the National Labor Relations 
Board; the Federal Election Commission; and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
Vermeule, supra note 31, at 1891-92. 
216 See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 31, at 1893 (arguing that courts “review[] agency 
determinations about due process with a light hand”). 
217 Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 172 (2002); see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 
437, 451 (1992) (explaining that “[t]he Due Process Clause does not . . . require a State to adopt one 
procedure over another on the basis that it may produce results more favorable to” the party 
challenging the existing procedures). 
218 See supra notes 86–95 and accompanying text. 
219 See supra Part II (discussing evidence generated by procedural innovations). 
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2. Tension Between Constitutional Entrenchment and Innovation 
Whenever courts are asked to hold that the Due Process Clause requires 
specific procedures, there is fear that constitutionalizing those procedures will 
entrench the procedures and stifle future innovation.220 This concern is 
particularly resonant here, as the dialogic approach to due process relies on 
procedural innovation occurring outside the realm of constitutional litigation. If 
the types of innovations described in Part II lead courts to hold that the Due 
Process Clause requires similar procedural safeguards in other jurisdictions, 
courts may reduce the incentives and flexibility that enable procedural 
innovation.221 Or viewed another way, the recent flourishing of innovation could 
be perceived as proof that the courts and the Constitution should keep out. 
But it is far from clear that entrenchment is a real concern with respect to 
procedural due process. The wave of procedural due process rulings in the 
1970s and 1980s did not prevent experimentation with procedures that had 
been rejected by courts or never tried in the past.222 Moreover, a dialogic 
approach to procedural due process could encourage future experimentation: 
it would demonstrate the courts’ openness to innovation and their willingness 
to consider data generated by jurisdictions and adjudicatory systems that opt 
to try new procedures. In that sense, the dialogic approach could become a 
force for anti-entrenchment, leading to procedural regimes that are more 
inclined to experiment with additional or alternative procedural safeguards. 
3. Disruption and Uncertainty 
There is no way to avoid disruption and uncertainty when engaging in a 
dialogic approach to procedural due process. The more experimentation and 
innovation that occurs, the higher the likelihood that due process doctrine will 
evolve in new and unexpected ways. This is the price of a constitutional right 
that is defined by its flexibility and responsiveness to changing 
 
220 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 83, at 254 (observing that “judicial declaration of process rights 
marks the end of innovation and adaptability”); Friendly, supra note 2, at 1301–02 (agreeing with 
Chief Justice Burger that it would be better “to hold the heavy hand of constitutional adjudication 
and allow evolutionary procedures at various administrative levels to develop, given their flexibility” 
(quoting Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 283 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting))); Levin, supra 
note 98, at 346 (“Constitutional holdings, by their nature, are especially hard to modify or overturn 
when experience casts doubt on their wisdom.”); cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976) 
(“[E]xperience with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate 
additional cost in terms of money and administrative burden would not be insubstantial.”). 
221 See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 2, at 1301-02 (cautioning courts to leave procedural 
developments to administrative agencies). 
222 See Parkin, supra note 11, at 1365-74 (discussing post-Goldberg procedural experimentation 
in the welfare context). 
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circumstances.223 In the end, if the evidence generated by procedural 
innovations shows that the benefits of an additional or substitute procedural 
safeguard outweigh the costs (per Mathews), or that the evidence reveals 
existing notice procedures not to be reasonably calculated to provide timely and 
adequate notice (per Mullane), then courts have no choice but to hold that the 
existing procedures do not satisfy the Constitution’s due process guarantee.224 
CONCLUSION 
It is an exciting time for procedural due process. Procedural systems that 
have been in place for decades are coming under new scrutiny. 
Experimentation with new and different procedural safeguards is occurring 
at the local, state, and federal levels. Whether prompted by the pro se crisis 
in civil courts, changes in technology, or a better understanding of the 
shortcomings of existing procedural regimes, procedural reform is emerging 
across a diverse set of jurisdictions and legal proceedings. 
Due process doctrine and theory are not experiencing a similar evolution, 
however. Even though the innovations described in this Article strike at the 
heart of procedural due process, they are not the result of constitutional 
litigation. The Supreme Court’s due process case law has changed little since 
the due process revolution, and the Court’s modern approach to procedural 
due process has been largely unreceptive to novel arguments based on new 
facts and circumstances. Indeed, if the proponents of today’s procedural 
reforms had first gone to court seeking new and different procedures, their 
claims almost certainly would have been denied. The result is a growing gap 
between procedural rights on the ground and due process doctrine. 
A dialogic approach to due process offers a way to reconcile bottom-up 
procedural innovations and due process doctrine. The Court’s modern 
approach to procedural due process is highly fact-dependent, and many 
current procedural innovations are generating precisely the types of data and 
information that the Court requires in due process litigation. For the first 
time, it may be possible for plaintiffs to produce evidence of the costs and 
benefits of novel procedures, enabling courts to more accurately balance the 
interests of the government and affected individuals. There is no guarantee 
that this kind of dialogue will result in courtroom victories or doctrinal 
change, but it is consistent with due process’s deeply rooted flexibility and 
adaptability, and it offers an opportunity for reviving and reunifying 
procedural due process doctrine. 
 
223 See supra subsection III.B.1. 
224 Changes in due process procedures need not always result in additional procedures. See David 
E. Benz, Is Less Ever More? Does the Due Process Clause Ever Require Fewer Procedures?, 65 DRAKE L. 
REV. 1 (2017) (arguing that the Due Process Clause can require less process in certain circumstances). 
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